Blogs, Cyber-Literature and Virtual Culture in Iran by Mina, Nima
  
Occasional Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
G
E
O
R
G
E
 C
. 
M
A
R
S
H
A
L
L
 
E
U
R
O
P
E
A
N
 C
E
N
T
E
R
 F
O
R
 S
E
C
U
R
IT
Y
 S
T
U
D
IE
S
 
Blogs, Cyber-Literature and 
Virtual Culture in Iran 
 
By Dr. Nima Mina 
   
No. 15 
December 2007 
ISSN 1863-6039 
 
 The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 
 
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is a leading 
transatlantic defense educational and security studies institution. It is bilaterally 
supported by the U.S. and German governments and dedicated to the creation of 
a more stable security environment by advancing democratic defense institutions 
and relationships; promoting active, peaceful engagement; and enhancing 
enduring partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe, and Eurasia. 
 
 
The Marshall Center Occasional Paper Series 
 
The Marshall Center Occasional Paper Series seeks to further the legacy of the 
Center’s namesake, General George C. Marshall, by disseminating scholarly 
essays that contribute to his ideal of ensuring that Europe and Eurasia are 
democratic, free, undivided, and at peace. Papers selected for this series are 
meant to identify, discuss, and influence current defense related security issues. 
The Marshall Center Occasional Paper Series focus is on comparative and 
interdisciplinary topics, including international security and democratic defense 
management, civil-military relations, strategy formulation, terrorism studies, 
defense planning, arms control, peacekeeping, crisis management, regional and 
cooperative security. The Marshall Center Occasional Papers are written by 
Marshall Center faculty and staff, Marshall Center alumni, or by individual, 
invited contributors, and are disseminated online and in a paper version. 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall 
European Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense, the 
German Ministry of Defense, or the U.S. and German Governments. The general 
editor of this series is the director of the George C. Marshall European Center for 
Security Studies. This report is approved for public release; distribution is 
unlimited. 
 
 
 
We invite comments and ask that you send them to: 
 
Director 
George C. Marshall Center 
ECMC-CL-RP 
Gernackerstraße 2 
82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen 
Germany 
 
ISSN 1863-6039 No. 15, December 2007
 
  
 
 
 
 
Blogs, Cyber-Literature and 
Virtual Culture in Iran 
 
 
 
 
 
By Dr. Nima Mina∗
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Date: December 2007
                                                 
∗ Dr. Nima Mina is a member of academic staff at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London (10 Thornhaugh Street; London WC1H 0XG; United Kingdom; nima.mina@soas.ac.uk; http:// 
www.soas.ac.uk). He received his academic training in Marburg, Germany and Montréal, Canada. His research 
interests include contemporary Iranian diaspora studies, Persian prison memoire writing, subversive literature 
and state security, and, more recently, the impact of new media on the progress of the Iranian civil society. His 
essays about multilingual Iranian diasporic authors like SAID (a.k.a. Said Mirhadi), and exiled writers like 
Mahshid Amirshahi and Esmail Khoi have been published widely in Europe and North America. His latest 
works on Josef Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall’s contributions to early 19th century European Studies of Iran 
were published by the University of Graz in Hammer’s home province of Steiermark in Austria and by the 
University of London’s School of Advanced Study / Institute of Germanic Studies. He has been a visiting faculty 
member at Ohio State University, and the Universities of Utah and Michigan in the United States and the Institut 
National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO) in Paris. 
 
 - 5 -
Introduction 
Since the beginning of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency in the summer of 2005, increased 
concerns about the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and its military use, the regime’s 
provocative anti-Semitic rhetoric and its systematic efforts to destabilize Afghanistan and Iraq 
have aggravated the confrontation between the Iranian regime and the international community 
more than ever. While severe sanctions are imposed under the auspices of the United Nation’s 
Security Council against the Islamic Republic, the possibility of a military strike to disable the 
political, defense and economic leadership of the regime is discussed openly between the 
proponents and opponents of such an option. 
As the adversarial relationship between the Islamic regime and the international community 
becomes more antagonistic, the Iranian people are increasingly losing their voice and are 
deprived of their right of self determination. The Iranian people are treated as identical with the 
dictatorial regime which has, many would argue, taken them hostage for the past 28 years. They 
are now in danger of becoming the real losers of a conflict provoked by the regime’s political 
and ideological agenda, which is being carried out without the people’s consent and against their 
interest. The Iranian people would be the primary victims of a military action against the Islamic 
Republic. 
Compared to other countries of the Middle East, the Iranian people have a high level of political 
maturity; an organized popular movement for democratic socio-political change in Iran has a 
history of more than 100 years. Despite the regime’s claim of total social control, Iranian civil 
society seems to have thrived since the mid 1990s and has succeeded in reclaiming certain 
critical areas of social life. Some observers of Iran, particularly those with an insider’s 
perspective, are convinced that the “problem” of the Islamic Republic can only be effectively 
solved in the interest of the international community if the initiative for a social and political 
change comes from within Iranian civil society. 
In order to estimate the possibilities and limitations of Iranian civil society in bringing about 
social and political change, it is helpful to observe its effectiveness in a sensitive area, namely 
that of independent public information. The beginning of the internet era in Iran has given 
Iranian civil society the possibility to create and defend alternative spaces for intellectual and 
political discourse, outside the realm of the regime-controlled established media. This paper 
deals with the internet as the vehicle and instrument of the new, independent Iranian information 
society. It starts with a recapitulation of the recent spectacular development of Persian web logs. 
It then looks at the ambivalent function of the internet, on the one hand offering a virtual refuge 
for civil society and on the other hand serving as a target of the Islamic regime and its 
ideological followers to expand their authority and influence. Four case studies demonstrate how 
the internet has supported the grassroots democracy movement both within and outside of Iran 
and made the disconnected communication between civil society within the country and the 
Iranian diaspora in Western Europe and North America possible. The paper ends with 
observations about some cultural-linguistic and social implications of the web log phenomenon 
for the future of the Iranian society. It comes to the conclusion that the independent information 
society will – particularly by the use of media like web logs – indirectly and only in the long run 
lead to political changes in Iran. 
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The Genesis of Blogs1 as a Mass Phenomenon in Iran 
An internet survey conducted by Blogherald2 indicated recently that in October 2005, 700,000 
Persian blogs were registered with various blog service providers. Out of this number, between 
40,000 and 110,000 were active, i.e. they were updated regularly by their editors. At the same 
time, the total number of all blogs worldwide was estimated at 100 million. Beside Persian blogs, 
there are currently thousands of active English blogs, written and published by Iranians in the 
USA, Canada und in Western Europe.3 In the beginning of the year 2006, the search engine 
Technorati4 counted Persian among the 10 most popular languages for blogging in the entire 
world.5 These figures are spectacularly high, considering that blogs as a Persian medium have 
only existed since mid-2001. Even general public access to the internet has a short story of less 
than ten years in Iran.6
The development of the internet in Iran dates back to the year 1989, when the Institute of 
Theoretical Physics and Mathematics (IPM)7 was founded in Tehran under the directorship of 
Mohammad Javad Larijani,8 one of the key figures of the conservative faction in the political 
leadership of the Islamic Republic. Among the initial members of research and teaching staff at 
IPM were younger scholars like Siavosh Shahshahani, 9  who were familiar with electronic 
communications like e-mail from the time of their university studies at European and North 
American academic institutions. They approached Larijani with the idea of creating e-mail 
facilities for IPM’s academic exchange with its international counterparts. Preliminary talks were 
held between Larijani and the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) 
in Trieste (Northern Italy) in 1989 about the connection of Iran to the BITNET of the European 
Academic Research  Network (EARN). Iran’s bid to join EARN was accepted conditionally: The 
Islamic Republic had to sign a written commitment to refrain from using EARN to spread 
religious propaganda and to promise NOT to obstruct data transfer between member states of 
EARN. The second condition was an indirect warning to the Islamic Republic against sabotaging 
data exchange between Iran and Israel. Larijani signed the agreement, including the specific 
conditions. Subsequently Iran’s connection with EARN was created through a dial-up link with 
the computer network of the University of Vienna in Austria. Mohammad Javad Larijani has 
ever since been a mighty supporter of investing in the IT and internet infrastructure in the Islamic 
Republic. His thoughts and actions in support of technological innovation on one hand and his 
continuous justification of the most reactionary interpretations of Islam on the other hand seem 
contradictory.10
                                                 
N.B. In the following, all Persian proper names and titles, which appear in English translation in the text body, will 
also be cited in the Persian alphabet in the footnotes. 
1 Blogs (contracted form of “weblog”) are digital internet diaries, in which entries appear in reverse chronological 
order. They are relatively simple instruments for editors (“bloggers”) to write and inform their audiences about 
aspects of their own life and to express their opinion about certain themes and topics. The first English blogs 
appeared on the internet in the mid-1990s and were initially called “online diaries.” 
2 Cf.: http://www.blogherald.com/2005/10/10/the-blog-herald-blog-count-october-2005/. 
3 For a complete and thematically structured list of English blogs by Iranians, see: http://www.blogsbyiranians.com. 
4 Cf: http://technorati.com/. 
5 Cf.: http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/persian/2006/11/post_132.html. 
6 Cf.: ﯽﻧﺎﻬﺸﻬﺷ شوﺎﻴﺳ ﺎﺑ ﻮﮕﺘﻔﮔ ﺖﻧﺮﺘﻨﻳا ﻪﺑ ناﺮﻳا دورو نﺎﺘﺳاد . ﻩرﺎﻤﺷ44تﺎﻃﺎﺒﺗرا و ﺮﺗﻮﭙﻣﺎﮐ ﮥﻣﺎﻨهﺎﻣ  . دادﺮﺧ1385.  
7 IPM; See: http://math.ipm.ac.ir. 
8 ﯽﻧﺎﺠﻳرﻻ داﻮﺟ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ 
9 ﯽﻧﺎﻬﺸﻬﺷ شوﺎﻴﺳ 
10 Larijani is one of the few aggressive public proponents of stonings as an appropriate form of punishment for 
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On 7 September 2001, an Iranian web developer named Salman Jariri 11  first published his 
manually coded Persian blog. He did not include any hyperlinks in his entries and did not allow 
comments underneath his blog.12 On 25 September 2001, Hossein Derakhshan,13 who at the time 
was working as an IT columnist in a reformist daily newspaper in Tehran, published his blog, 
which was also coded manually. On 5 November 2001, Derakhshan published his often quoted 
“guidelines” for the creation of Persian blogs on Google’s user-friendly website that allows the 
general public to set up weblogs, www.blogger.com.14 Derakhshan’s instructions facilitated the 
development and later explosive growth of Persian blogs. 
On 21 June 2002, the service www.persianblog.com was inaugurated. The first public space 
allowing social encounters for bloggers outside the virtual world named “Café Blog” was opened 
on 22 September 2002 in the wealthy northern neighborhoods of Tehran.15 In the meantime, the 
total number of internet cafés, which also serve as social gathering venues for bloggers and their 
readers, is estimated at 1,500 in Tehran alone. 
 
 
Collective Blogs as a Grass Roots Exercise in Political Pluralism 
Gradually, several groups of bloggers came together and founded collective blogs like 
Cappucino,16  whose content is developed in constant dialogue and cooperation between the 
various authors. The group blog Hanouz17 was founded by a number of younger journalists like 
Ali Aghar Seyed-Abadi,18 Arash Hassan-Nia,19 Armen Norsessian20 and Gissou Faghfouri,21 
who had lost their jobs as a result of massive newspaper bans and media restrictions imposed 
immediately after the beginning of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency in June 2005. 
The popularity of individual blogs depends on how often they are updated and how much new 
material they have to offer. Many Iranian political bloggers are professional journalists, who 
have lost their access to the public media in the recent years. They have to earn a living with jobs 
other than professional journalism. This leaves them little time to update and keep a regular pool 
of readers attached to their blogs. The organization form of collective blogs offers a practical 
solution for this problem, as several editors can always keep a blog updated. This form of 
collaboration is also a valuable exercise in grass roots democracy, which for the first time in 
modern Iranian history has produced pluralistic media, in which authors can express a variety of 
views and opinions free from any “homogenizing” editorial scrutiny and censorship. The group 
                                                                                                                                                             
adultery in today’s Iran, which, he insists, is in perfect accord with the unquestionable principles of Islam. (See, 
for instance, a video clip of an interview with Larijani, in which he defends a recent case of stoning in Takestan, 
in the province of Qazvin at: http://www.radiozamaneh.org/movie/2007/07/post_37.html). 
11 ﯼﺮﻳﺮﺟ نﺎﻤﻠﺳ 
12 Compare http://shalakhteh.persianblog.com/1385_5_shalakhteh_archive.html#5471405
13 نﺎﺸﺧرد ﻦﻴﺴﺣ 
14 See: ﻢﻳزﺎﺴﺑ ﯽﺳرﺎﻓ گﻼﺑو ﮏﻳ ﻪﻧﻮﮕﭼ http://i.hoder.com/archives/2001/11/011105_005346.shtml. 
15 See: http://www.cafe-blog.com
16 See: http://www.cappuccinomag.com/
17 http://www.hanouz.com/
18 ﯼدﺎﺑﺁ ﺪﻴﺳ ﺮﻐﺻا ﯽﻠﻋ 
19 ﺎﻴﻧ ﻦﺴﺣ شرﺁ 
20 نﺎﻴﺴﺳﺮﻧ ﻦﻣرﺁ 
21 ﯼرﻮﻔﻐﻓ ﻮﺴﻴﮔ 
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blog, Realm of Malakut,22 was founded by several philosophically informed and aesthetically 
talented intellectuals, who mostly live abroad. Among them are Iranian cultural icons as the 
lexicographer, philosopher and translator of Nietzsche and Shakespeare Daryoush Ashouri23  
from Paris, the painter and sculptor Akram Abooyi24 from Berlin, the musician and writer Amir 
Hossein Sam25 from Oxford and the poet and documentary filmmaker Mehdi Jami,26 who also 
founded this group blog. 
 
 
Media Restrictions as a Trigger for Independent Cyber Journalism 
During Mohammad Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005), the judiciary remained under the control 
of the conservative faction, which used it as an instrument to “roll back” the reformist movement 
and impose restrictions on pro-reform media outlets. Younger professional journalists, who had 
lost their employment when their newspapers were closed, discovered “cyber journalism,” 
through blogs, to offer an opportunity to continue writing without fear of persecution by the state, 
“internal” censorship by authoritarian and conformist chief editors or patronization by older 
colleagues. The number of older journalists who also “converted” to this new medium was 
minimal. Younes Shokrkhah27 from the Tehran School of Communicative Sciences28 was the 
first Iranian university teacher, who offered classes in cyber journalism in the academic year 
2001/2. A number of future independent bloggers were Shokrkhah’s former disciples, although 
he himself probably never intended to engage in any socio-political movement outside the 
Islamic Republic’s government establishment. 
Many young journalists who started their careers during Khatami’s presidency and lost their jobs 
around 2000 left the country and found employment as cyber journalists in the newly established 
online editions of foreign media outlets like BBC radio’s Persian service29 and later Radio Free 
Europe / Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Persian language Radio Farda.30
BBC started its Persian online service in 2001; its news webpage is updated every 15 minutes. 
With 1.25 million daily visitors, this service was the most popular source of political and social 
information in Persian on the internet until it was blocked in Iran by the Islamic Republic’s 
                                                 
22 تﻮﮑﻠﻣ ﻪﻘﻠﺣ; http://www.malakut.org. 
23 ﯼرﻮﺷﺁ شﻮﻳراد 
24 ﯽﻳﻮﺑا مﺮﮐا 
25 مﺎﺳ ﻦﻴﺴﺣ ﺮﻴﻣا 
26 ﯽﻣﺎﺟ ﯼﺪﻬﻣ 
27 ﻩاﻮﺧﺮﮑﺷ ﺲﻧﻮﻳ; Cf.: http://www.shokrkhah.com. 
28 تﺎﻃﺎﺒﺗرا مﻮﻠﻋ ۀﺪﮑﺸﻧاد; Born in Mashhad in 1957, Shokrkhah studied at the Allame Tabatabai University  ﻪﻣﻼﻋ ﻩﺎﮕﺸﻧاد
ﯽﻳﺎﺒﻃﺎﺒﻃ in Tehran. In 1981, he was a core member of a group of the Iranian Republic’s conformist journalists, 
who took over all key positions in all established newspapers in Tehran after these were violently “cleansed” of 
ideologically suspect staff members. Shokrkhah started his career on the editorial board of Keyhan daily 
newspaper and was for 16 years responsible for its “international section.” At the same time, he worked for 
numerous other newspapers and magazines as well, including Ketab-e Hafte ﻪﺘﻔه بﺎﺘﮐ and Hamshahri ﯼﺮﻬﺸﻤه. In 
the early stages of the internet boom in Iran, he created Jam-e Jam Online ﻦﻳﻼﻧﺁ ﻢﺟ مﺎﺟ and Hamshahri Online 
ﻦﻳﻼﻧﺁ ﯼﺮﻬﺸﻤه, under the license of the official state radio and television organization ﺎﻤﻴﺳ و اﺪﺻ and the office of 
the mayor of Tehran. More than ten authored and edited books as well as dozens of translated volumes by 
Shokrkhah belong to the standard reading material used for the professional training of journalists in the Iranian 
Republic. Cf.: http://younesspace.blogspot.com/2004/05/1.html. 
29 Cf.: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian. 
30 Cf.: http://www.radiofarda.org. 
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internet censors in January 2007. For its extensive online service, BBC hired between 25 and 30 
journalists directly from Iran through job interviews that were partly held in Iran’s neighboring 
country Turkey. The new employees were mostly younger journalists who knew BBC’s target 
audience inside the country from first hand experience. Radio Farda’s Persian service was 
founded in November 2006 according to a similar concept as BBC Persian, mainly with the help 
of recently emigrated young journalists from inside Iran.31
 
 
The Discovery of Blogs by Populist Politicians 
While spreading rapidly across Iranian society, blogs started reaching the highest levels of the 
Islamic Republic’s government officials, as well. On 24 November 2002, Mohammad Ali Abtahi, 
Khatami’s vice-president for legal and parliamentary affairs, started his own blog. 32  In an 
exclusive article for BBC’s Persian service,33  Abtahi wrote that before becoming a blogger 
himself, he spent many hours reading blogs by young Iranians. He found them more insightful 
than the daily confidential information bulletins about the state of Iranian society prepared for 
cabinet members by the country’s intelligence organizations. According to Abtahi, blogs show 
directly what is going on in the heads of the younger generation and are indispensible sources for 
politicians who are concerned about this generation. 34  On 16 January 2004, a number of 
reformist members of parliament created a blog and used it to inform the general public about 
their action, thereby emulating the methods of the opposition outside the regime’s establishment.  
In the fall of 2005, a few months after Mohammad Khatami had stepped down as president, the 
editors of the journal Chehel Cheragh35 created a website and a blog for him with the name, 
“The man with the chocolate colored robe.”36 During a public event at the Bahman cultural 
centre in southern Tehran, they gave Khatami the login and password to his blog and expressed 
hope that he would join the online community as soon as possible. Khatami’s first blog entry 
received comments from 400 readers. Several of them expressed the wish that Khatami would 
take the opportunity and discuss the “untold”37 stories of his presidency, i.e., explain why the 
reformist project failed after eight years. Khatami never did so and soon afterwards lost interest 
in his blog. 
                                                 
31 The head of Radio Farda’s online service is Jamshid Barzegar. Before his departure from Iran in 2001, he was 
the editor in chief of Hambastegi ﯽﮕﺘﺴﺒﻤه daily newspaper. Because of his membership in the executive board of 
the Iranian Writers’ Association ناﺮﻳا نﺎﮔﺪﻨﺴﻳﻮﻧ نﻮﻧﺎﮐ, Barzegar was forced to resign from his job. Like many other 
younger journalists with academic aspirations and solid knowledge of several foreign languages, he managed to 
leave the country to study abroad, in his case as a PhD student in political science in Vienna. From there, he 
started working for BBC Persian’s online service and since the summer of 2006 for Radio Farda. (Interview 
with Jamshid Barzegar on Friday 10 August 2007). 
32 http://www.webneveshteha.com/. 
33 Cf.: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2004/11/041107_mj-iran-web-log-anniv.shtml. 
34 See also: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4315455.stm. 
35 40غاﺮﭼ  
36 ﯽﺗﻼﮑﺷ ﯼﺎﺒﻋ ﺎﺑ ﯼدﺮﻣ 
37 ﺎه ﻪﺘﻔﮔﺎﻧ 
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The Conservatives’ Attempt to Take Possession of the New Medium 
After some prominent and high ranking reformists had discovered the new medium for 
themselves, it also caught the attention of the “traditional conservatives.”38 With the beginning 
of Mahmoud Ahmdinejad’s presidency in June 2005, conservative regime conformist blogs 
started to boom. On 14 August 2007, President Ahmadinejad himself started his blog with a long 
entry.39 His blog continues to be published in Persian, English, French and Arabic. 
In June 2007, the first “festival of revolutionary blogs and websites” took place in Tehran under 
the official patronage of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (“Ershad”).40  In his 
keynote speech at this festival, the Ershad minister, Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi,41 put 
forward a number of theses that indicate the new direction of the Islamic Republic’s internet and 
new media policy. He announced that title of his vice-minister for “press affairs”42 would be 
changed to “media affairs,”43 specifically to include the internet and blogs. In the future, blogs 
and the internet would be regarded as greater priorities than the “traditional press.” His ministry 
would actively sponsor the development and expansion of blogs that “propagate the values of the 
Islamic Revolution” and help them to “increase the cultural authority of the Islamic Republic in 
the virtual sphere.” 
These statements clearly show that even the most conservative fundamentalists at the top of the 
Islamic Republic’s leadership pyramid like Saffar Harandi cannot be declared as “enemies of the 
internet” in an undifferentiated manner. They are “friends” of the internet but would like to use it 
for their own agenda, whether it is to gather intelligence from open media or to spread their own 
manipulation and propaganda. 
 
 
The Conservative Campaign for Ideological Homogenization of Media 
Shortly after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election as president in June 2005, there were clear 
indications of a conservative campaign for a stronger ideological homogenization of media and 
centralization of state power. During the first two years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, more than 
100 newspapers and other periodicals were banned. On 9 July 2007, one day after a meeting 
between the “Minister of Islamic Guidance,” Saffar Harandi, as well as license holders and 
editors in chief of newspapers and new agencies, an anonymous editorial was published in the 
conformist newspaper, Iran, in which the few remaining critical press organs were accused of 
interpreting “the reservedness and modesty of the government” as signs of weakness and turning 
themselves into “conspiratorial, hostile pamphlets.” 44  Anonymous editorials in Iran usually 
reflect the views of the government. Shortly before the publication of this editorial, the daily 
newspaper Ham Mihan45 had been banned, the license of the reformist outlet Mosharekat46 
                                                 
38 ﯽﺘﻨﺳ نارﺎﮐ ﻪﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ 
39 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4790005.stm ; See Ahmadinejad’s Blog at: http://www.ahmadinejad.ir. 
40 ﯽﻣﻼﺳا دﺎﺷرا و ﮓﻨهﺮﻓ ﺮﻳزو 
41 ﯼﺪﻧﺮه رﺎﻔﺻ ﻦﻴﺴﺣ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ; An Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) general and former political prison 
interrogator, he held key positions on the editorial boards of Keyhan daily and Kayhan-e Havayi ﯽﻳاﻮه نﺎﻬﻴﮐ 
between 1994 and 2005. Compare: http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8411260563. 
42 ﯽﺗﺎﻋﻮﺒﻄﻣ ﺖﻧوﺎﻌﻣ 
43 ﯼا ﻪﻧﺎﺳر ﺖﻧوﺎﻌﻣ 
44 ﺖﻟود ﻪﻴﻠﻋ ﻪﻣﺎﻨﺒﺷ 
45 ﻦﻬﻴﻣ ﻢه 
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annulled and the director of the Iran Labor News Agency (ILNA) 47  forced to resign. The 
editorial explicitly reminded the critical press of the fate of more than 300 newspapers and 
journals banned since 1997 upon direct orders of the “supreme leader” of the Islamic Republic, 
Ali Khameni, and warned them about the “grave consequences of their attitude.” 
The Islamic press community is generally controlled by three factions within the regime. There 
are the “traditional conservatives,” the “government internal (religious) reformists”48 (who were 
rapidly removed from key positions after Ahmadinejad came to power) and Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani’s Kargozaran Party. 49  Newspapers and journals sympathizing with the religious 
reformist movement have been under constant pressure through a variety of mechanisms, 
including the selective awarding of licenses, arbitrary bans, arrest of journalists and license 
holders and blocking of their websites.  
According to the reformist activist Mohammad Javad Haqshenas,50 only 3 % of all press outlets 
are under the control of the critics of the government, whereas 70 % are run by active supporters 
of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The above-mentioned editorial in Iran is actually addressed to this 
3 % minority within the otherwise domesticated and homogenized press community. The 
aggressive tone of this editorial is a reaction to the increasing pressure that the current leadership 
of the Islamic Republic is sensing from economic embargo and diplomatic isolation from outside 
the country. 
 
 
The Systematic Expansion of the State’s Media Control of the Internet 
According to official figures published by the Iranian Ministry of Communication and 
Information Technology,51 the total number of internet users in 2001 was estimated at 1 million. 
This number increased to 5 million in 2005, 11 million in 2007 and by 2009, 25 million users are 
expected. At present, there are 650 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and 150 Internet Content 
Providers (ICPs) active in Iran. A company named Data Corporation52 is currently the biggest 
ISP in Iran and the main link to the state telecommunications authority. Most other ISPs receive 
their access to the internet through Data Corporation and are subject to restrictions imposed 
upon them by the government through this company. 
Since the internet and related technologies have come to the Islamic Republic, the government 
has issued preliminary regulations for the activity of ISPs.53 According to these regulations, all 
private ISPs must be in possession of filtering facilities to block specific websites included in the 
government’s “black lists,” which contain millions of addresses. Since mid-2006, the leadership 
of the Islamic Republic seems to have centralized the filtering practice in order to selectively 
block certain websites. The government’s “black lists” are compiled and updated by the Supreme 
Council for Communication Affairs.54 The Committee for the Determination of the Applicability 
                                                                                                                                                             
46 ﺖﮐرﺎﺸﻣ 
47 Iran Labor News Agency ناﺮﻳا رﺎﮐ ﯼراﺰﮔﺮﺒﺧ 
48 ﯽﺘﻣﻮﮑﺣ نﺎﺒﻠﻃ حﻼﺻا 
49 ﯽﮔﺪﻧزﺎﺳ ناراﺰﮔرﺎﮐ بﺰﺣ 
50 سﺎﻨﺷ ﻖﺣ داﻮﺟ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ 
51 تﺎﻋﻼﻃا ﯼروﺁ ﻦﻓ و تﺎﻃﺎﺒﺗرا ترازو 
52 ﺎﺘﻳد تﺎﻃﺎﺒﺗرا ﺖﮐﺮﺷ 
53  ﻂﺑاﻮﺿ و تارﺮﻘﻣﯼا ﻪﻧﺎﻳار ﯼا ﻪﻧﺎﺳر عﻼﻃا ﯼﺎه ﻪﮑﺒﺷ  
54 ﯽﻧﺎﺳر عﻼﻃا ﯽﻟﺎﻋ ﯼارﻮﺷ 
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of Filtering, 55  composed of three members representing the state radio and television 
organization,56 the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)57 and the Supreme Council of 
Cultural Revolution58 is the country’s central executive organ steering internet filtering policies. 
Interestingly, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology has no representative 
in this committee. 
The centralization process seems to be constantly undermined on all levels by the Islamic 
Republic’s own government organs. From time to time, the Judiciary, which is not represented in 
the “filtering committee” either, gets involved directly and issues instructions and prohibitions to 
ISPs. Likewise, the filtering committee’s policies seem to be enforced with various degrees of 
strictness in different parts of the country. In the southern and south-eastern border regions,59 
which were destabilized by ethnic and religious conflicts during the past years, filtering and 
blocking of unapproved websites is enforced more strictly. Occasionally, the internet connection 
of entire provinces has been switched off. On the other hand, users can often access blocked 
websites during the night or from specific locations like university computer centers and 
newspaper editorial offices.60
So far, the “filtering committee” has never justified its decisions to block certain internet sites. 
The only explicitly formulated filtering rule is rather vague and was issued by the Supreme 
Council for Cultural Revolution. It requires the ban of “heretic publications that contradict the 
principles of Islam and insult its holiness and advertise for forbidden political groups and 
parties.”61
In mid-July 2005, a bill about “computer crimes”62 was agreed upon and sent on to the 7th 
parliament of the Islamic Republic for approval by the newly constituted cabinet of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad. The bill claimed to target “economic crimes”63 committed with computers as well 
as pornography and hacker activities, but in reality it was solely applied to “political offenses.” 
At about this time, the popular websites Flickr, YouTube, Wikipedia und the New York Times 
were banned and the maximum speed of broadband internet connections was limited by law to 
128 kilobytes per second (KBps), in order to prevent uploads and downloads of  large audio and 
video files over the internet. 
 
 
Internet Filtering as a Tool in the Islamic Republic’s Internal Rivalries 
Internet filtering, website blocking and even the surveillance of the mobile telephone network are 
not just weapons against oppositional activity outside the regime. Occasionally they are also used 
as instruments in the power struggle between rival factions in the conservative camp in the 
leadership of the Islamic Republic. In February 2007, as well as earlier during 2006, the website 
                                                 
55 ﮓﻨﻳﺮﺘﻠﻴﻓ ﻖﻳدﺎﺼﻣ ﻦﻴﻴﻌﺗ ﮥﺘﻴﻤﮐ 
56 ناﺮﻳا ﯽﻣﻼﺳا ﯼرﻮﻬﻤﺟ ﯼﺎﻤﻴﺳ و اﺪﺻ 
57 ﯽﻣﻼﺳا ﯼرﻮﻬﻤﺟ ﺖﻴﻨﻣا و تﺎﻋﻼﻃا ترازو 
58 ﯽﮕﻨهﺮﻓ بﻼﻘﻧا ﯽﻟﺎﻋ ﯼارﻮﺷ 
59 Sistan and Balutschestan نﺎﺘﺴﭼﻮﻠﺑ و نﺎﺘﺴﻴﺳ and Khuzestan نﺎﺘﺳزﻮﺧ. 
60 This information is based on an interview on Tuesday 14 August with the exiled cyber-journalist Ebrahim 
Nabavi (Brussels) about reader response surveys he conducted about his own blog and various websites. 
61 ﻪﺑ ﺖﻧﺎها ،ﯽﻣﻼﺳا ﻦﻳزاﻮﻣ ﻒﻟﺎﺨﻣ و ﺰﻴﻣﺁ ﺮﻔﮐ ﺐﻟﺎﻄﻣﯽﻧﻮﻧﺎﻗ ﺮﻴﻏ باﺰﺣا و ﺎﻬهوﺮﮔ ﻎﻴﻠﺒﺗ و ﻪﻋﺎﺷا ،نﺁ تﺎﺳﺪﻘﻣ و مﻼﺳا ﻦﻳد .  
62 ﯼا ﻪﻧﺎﻳار ﻢﻳاﺮﺟ ﻪﺤﻳﻻ 
63 ﯼدﺎﺼﺘﻗا ﻢﻳاﺮﺟ 
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Baztab64 was temporarily blocked for readers inside Iran. The license owner and general editor 
of Baztab is Mohsen Rezai,65 a member of the Islamic Republic’s Expediency Council66 and a 
veteran of the security and intelligence network since the early 1980s, notably the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the MOIS.67 Baztab was blocked because it published 
articles that criticized the work of the nuclear negotiation team of the Islamic Republic, at that 
time lead by the cleric Hassan Rohani. 
The mobile telephone network has been subject to surveillance many times since the fall of 2005 
specifically before and during national or regional elections. In an interview68 with the Iranian 
Science and Information Technology News Agency (SITNA) 69  on 22 June 2007, Vafa 
Ghaffarian70 from the telecommunication authority announced that his organization would even 
“reward mobile phone users who came forward with information leading to the identification of 
individuals disseminating ‘immoral’ MMS71 through the mobile phone network.” This open 
invitation to paid denunciation is related to a directive issued by the Supreme Council of Cultural 
Revolution to the telecommunication authority to purchase the necessary equipment in order to 
“extend communication surveillance to the mobile phone network, prevent the ‘abuse’ of SMS72 
and MMS facilities and combat the ‘social problems’ resulting from this abuse.” Ghaffarian 
added that his organization would introduce random content checks and “limit” text messaging 
facilities before political elections, in order to prevent “negative propaganda against certain 
candidates.” 
This was an allusion to a controversy which arose before the presidential election in June 2005 
and the elections of the Islamic City and Village Councils73 in the fall of that same year. At that 
time, one of Ahmadinejad’s close associates named Mehrdad Pazrpash 74  claimed to have 
uncovered “a destructive campaign” against Ahmadinejad, carried out by the “son of his 
competitor” (most probably Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani75), using 20 government-owned mobile 
phones. 
 
 
Remarks about Smart Filter and Secure Computing 
 
According to Reza Parsa, president of the Iranian ISP Association, the telecommunication 
authority uses the program Smart Filter by the American company Secure Computing in order to 
filter the Internet within Iran, because filtering software from domestic production has not yet 
reached the quality level of “intelligent” foreign filtering programs. Meanwhile, Secure 
                                                 
64 بﺎﺗزﺎﺑ; Cf.: www.baztab.ir. 
65 ﯽﻳﺎﺿر ﻦﺴﺤﻣ ; See his personal website at: http://rezaee.ir. 
66 مﺎﻈﻧ ﺖﺤﻠﺼﻣ ﺺﻴﺨﺸﺗ ﻊﻤﺠﻣ; in English: “Expediency Council”. Cf.: http://www.majma.ir. 
67 http://www.radiofarda.com/Article/2007/02/20/f5_filter_isp_iran.html. 
68 Compare http://www.radiofarda.org/Aricle/2007/06/23/f3-MMS.html. 
69 Science and Information Technology News Agency تﺎﻋﻼﻃا ﯼروﺁ ﻦﻓ و مﻮﻠﻋ ﯼراﺰﮔﺮﺒﺧ ; Cf.: www.sitna.ir. 
70 نﺎﻳرﺎﻔﻏ ﺎﻓو 
71 Multimedia Messaging Service. 
72 Short Messaging Service. 
73 ﺎﺘﺳور و ﺮﻬﺷ ﯽﻣﻼﺳا ﯼﺎهارﻮﺷ 
74 شﺎﭘزﺬﺑ دادﺮﻬﻣ 
75 ﯽﻧﺎﺠﻨﺴﻓر ﯽﻤﺷﺎه ﺮﺒﮐا ﯽﻠﻋ 
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Computing has denied any business relations with the Islamic Republic.76 The illegal use of 
Smart Filter constitutes an act of international copyright infringement. If Iran joins the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in the future, the regime will have to pay a high fine for this kind of 
piracy. According to Secure Computing, the Islamic Republic’s “moral guardians” are using a 
pirated beta version of Smart Filter. This explains a series of filtering mistakes and 
“misunderstandings,” like the temporary blocking of Grand Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani’s website. 
It should be added that Smart Filter only targets HTTP protocols, therefore it does not affect 
internet services like e-mail, FTP and chat. 
 
 
International Campaigns against Internet Censorship in Iran 
In October 2005, the organization “Reporters sans Frontières”77 declared the Islamic Republic to 
be one of the world’s 15 greatest enemies of the internet.78 On 18 December 2006, the London-
based human rights organization ARTICLE 19 started an interactive campaign with the title, The 
Persian Impediment,79 against internet censorship in Iran. In the publications of this campaign, 
the organizational structures of internet censorship in the Islamic Republic and the regime’s 
repressive measures against bloggers are disclosed and criticized.  
A research report published on 18 May 2007 by the OpenNet Initiative80 of Oxford, Cambridge, 
Harvard and Toronto universities investigated internet regulation in 40 countries, including the 
Palestinian Authority. This report identifies the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic 
Republic as the world’s biggest internet censors. In 25 out of the 40 investigated countries, 
websites are blocked. Iran, China, Myanmar, Syria, Tunisia and Vietnam censor political internet 
sites on a large scale. As is the case in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab 
Emirates and Yemen, Iran is one of the countries that censor radically internet pages with sexual 
content.81 From 1477 websites chosen by the OpenNet Initiative for this investigation, 499 (i.e., 
more than 30 %) were blocked in Iran. Most of these pages are in the Persian language. The 
report also indicates that 50 % of all Persian and only 5 % of English political websites are 
blocked inside Iran. And finally, an average of 95 % of all proxy server and anonymizer services 
was banned. 
 
 
The Judiciary against Bloggers 
Even before blogs turned into a mass phenomenon in Iranian society, the judiciary started 
repressive measures to intimidate bloggers who are critical of the government. Blogs are 
increasingly used, for instance, as a mobilization instrument for protests against the arrest of 
dissidents. An early example for this was a campaign initiated by Reza Shokrollahi through his 
blog Khabgard82 against the incarceration of a fellow writer named Yaghoub Yadali.83 The first 
                                                 
76 http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/category.cfm?id=4; see also: http://sethf.com/infothought/blog/archives/00087 
5.html. 
77 CF.: http://www.rsf.org. 
78 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/11/28/wblog28.xml. 
79 See: http://www.persianimpediment.org. 
80 See: http://opennet.net. 
81 http://www.radiofarda.com/Article/2007/05/19/o2_block_web.html. 
82 دﺮﮕﺑاﻮﺧ; See: http://www.khabgard.com. 
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prominent case of a blogger’s arrest that found broad media coverage was that of Sina 
Motallebi.84 In 2001, Motallebi was working as a film critic and cultural columnist for a Tehran 
reformist daily newspaper. At the same time, he wrote his own blog named Rooz Negar. Because 
of an entry about the imprisoned writer and activist Akbar Ganji, Motallebi was arrested and 
interrogated in the fall of 2001. In the following 18 months, he was summoned four more times 
by the judiciary and in April 2003 he was arrested and put in prison. He remained 22 days in 
solitary confinement and was subject to psychological torture. He was only released after his 
family came up with the bail sum of $60,000. Upon his release, he immediately fled the country 
and joined his wife in the Netherlands, where she had been running a blog campaign for his 
release. Today he lives in London and is working for the online section of BBC’s Persian 
service.85  
In prison, the access data for Rooz Negar was pressed out of Motallebi and used by MOIS agents 
to highjack ROOZ NEGAR, writing misleading entries in the blog and forging his name. As soon 
as it became generally known that Sina Motallebi had fled the country, his father, Said Motallebi, 
an apolitical lawyer and filmmaker, was arrested. Said Motallebi’s kidnapping and the 
blackmailing of Sina led to a protest movement in and outside the country against the judiciary 
and the “reformist” President Khatami. Khatami remained silent to avoid an open confrontation 
with the conservative dominated judiciary and thereby discredited himself in the eyes of his own 
supporters.86
One effective tactic used by the judiciary is to set extremely high bail sums for imprisoned 
bloggers. Since their families are unable to come up with the money, the bloggers remain in 
prison and often have to serve their entire sentence, which removes them from the public sphere 
as intended by the judiciary. The bloggers Arash Sigarchi 87  and Mojtaba Samiinejad, 88  for 
instance, were arrested in January and November 2005 respectively. According to the New 
York-based organization “Human Rights Watch,”89 Samiinejad was held for 88 days in solitary 
confinement and tortured. Samiinejad had written in his blog about the arrest and kidnapping of 
three fellow bloggers. He was first apprehended on 27 January and released but then arrested 
again on 12 February and put on trial on charges of “insulting the prophet, the prophet’s 
successors and the holiness of Islam.” He remained in the Karaj prison until 13 September 2006. 
The bail for his release had been set by the court at $125,000, a sum that his family was unable to 
pay. Sigarchi was arrested and tried in his home town Rasht90 on similar charges. Initially he was 
sentenced to 14 years in prison and his bail set at $200,000. An appeals court reduced the 
sentence to three years, which he will have to serve in its entirety. 
                                                                                                                                                             
83 ﯽﻟاﺪﻳ بﻮﻘﻌﻳ 
84 ﯽﺒﻠﻄﻣ ﺎﻨﻴﺳ 
85 Interview with Sina Motallebi on  August 8, 2007. 
86 See the unusually harsh tone in an open letter by the prominent Khatami supporter Ebrahim Nabavi:  ﯽﻤﺗﺎﺧ ﯼﺎﻗﺁ !
ﺟ ﺖﻠﻴﻀﻓﺖﺴﻴﻧ مﺮﺟ ﻪﮐ ندﻮﺑ رﺪﭘ ،ﺖﺳا مﺮ  in: http://news.gooya.com/nabavi/archives/015971.php. 
87 ﯽﭼرﺎﮕﻴﺳ شرﺁ 
88 داﮋﻧ ﯽﻌﻴﻤﺳ ﯽﺒﺘﺠﻣ 
89 Compare: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=RSDCOI&page=research&id=43cfaea 
120. 
90 ﺖﺷر 
 
 - 16 -
Resistance against Forced Blog Registration 
On 5 January 2007, the prosecutor Said Mortazavi ordered all Iranian ISPs to block a number of 
blog service providers. Later, in June, all Iranian bloggers were ordered to register their blogs 
through a virtual government office.91 In the registration process, bloggers who write under a 
pseudonym have to disclose their real identity and all access data for their blogs. Individuals who 
do not comply with these orders must expect their blogs to be filtered and blocked for readers in 
and perhaps outside of the country. The government can indeed order Iran-based services like 
www.persian.com to filter unregistered blogs. At present, there are 780,000 blogs registered with 
PersianBlog, 10 % of which are updated daily.92 The judiciary’s registration directive triggered a 
wide civil resistance action by non-conformist bloggers. Even some bloggers who publish under 
their own names and live inside the country participated in the resistance. The journalist and 
women’s movement activist, Parastoo Dokouhaki, for example, published a banner in her blog93 
announcing that she would boycott the registration. 
 
 
State Security Organizations against Secular Intellectuals 
In May 2007, the Tehran daily newspaper Kayhan started a defamatory article series against a 
number of well-known intellectuals, artists and film makers, who mostly reside and work in Iran. 
In these articles, a strange mix of people including the filmmaker Abbas Kiarostami, 94  the 
photographer Mariam Zandi,95 the graphic artist Ebrahim Haqiqi,96 the editor Ali Dehbashi,97 
the director of the Tehran House of Artists98 Behrooz Gharibpoor,99 the former director of the 
Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art Alireza Sami’-Azar100 and others were accused of secretly 
preparing a “velvet revolution” in order to “softly overthrow” the Islamic Republic. 
In Iranian intellectual circles, these attacks are perceived as reminiscent of similar “warning 
signs” issued by Kayhan prior to the “serial murders” 101 of the 1990s. In the course of the “serial 
murders,” the writers Mohammad Mokhtari 102  and Mohammad Jafar Pooyande 103  and the 
political activists Dariush Forouhar, 104  Parvaneh Eskandari105  and Pirooz Davani, 106  among 
others, were murdered by MOIS operatives. The serial murders of 1997 were also initiated by a 
defamatory article series in Keyhan daily. 
                                                 
91 www.samandehi.ir. 
92 Compare: http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jun/07/newmedia.iran. 
93 Compare:  ﺖﺷﻮﻧ نز–ﯽﮑهﻮﮐود ﻮﺘﺳﺮﭘ ﯼﺎﻬﺘﺷاددﺎﻳ  http://weblog.parastood.ir. 
94 ﯽﻤﺘﺳرﺎﻴﮐ سﺎﺒﻋ 
95 ﻧز ﻢﻳﺮﻣﯼﺪ  
96 ﯽﻘﻴﻘﺣ ﻢﻴهاﺮﺑا 
97 ﯽﺷﺎﺒهد ﯽﻠﻋ 
98 ناﺪﻨﻣﺮﻨه ﮥﻧﺎﺧ 
99 رﻮﭘ ﺐﻳﺮﻏ زوﺮﻬﺑ 
100 رذﺁ ﻊﻴﻤﺳ ﺎﺿﺮﻴﻠﻋ 
101 ﯼا ﻩﺮﻴﺠﻧز ﯼﺎﻬﻠﺘﻗ 
102 ﯼرﺎﺘﺨﻣ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ 
103 ﻩﺪﻨﻳﻮﭘ ﺮﻔﻌﺟ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ 
104 ﺮهوﺮﻓ شﻮﻳراد 
105 ﯼرﺪﻨﮑﺳا ﻪﻧاوﺮﭘ 
106 ﯽﻧاود زوﺮﻴﭘ 
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In the new Keyhan series of articles, any “advertisement for secularism,” even translations of 
foreign books and articles that introduce western critical social theories in Iranian intellectual 
debates, are qualified as “espionage activity on behalf of the enemies of the Islamic Republic.” 
Keyhan published a peculiar list of the “centers of the hostile cultural offensive” against the 
Islamic Republic. The list includes a variety of professional organizations, academic associations 
and political parties as the centers of “conspiracy,” including the House of Artists, the 
Sociological Association, 107  the Freedom Movement 108  and the Mojahedin of the Islamic 
Revolution,109 the latter having held top government positions until June 2005. 
The series of articles is indicative of new aggressive efforts by the ruling military and 
intelligence faction to impose even more political and cultural restrictions upon Iranian society. 
Members of this faction have been occupying most important key positions of power in the 
Islamic Republic since the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s presidency and are, as always, using 
Keyhan as their mouthpiece. 
Between January and June 2007, four American citizens of Iranian descent were apprehended 
one after another by the MOIS: Hale Esfandiari,110 director of the Middle East program in the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C., Kian Tajbakhsh,111 
social scientist and internationally renowned expert in urban planning and public health, Ali 
Shakeri,112 Californian real estate developer and member of the Center for Citizen Peacebuilding 
at the University of California in Irvine and Parnaz Azima,113 editor and producer in the US-
funded RFE/RL’s Persian program Radio Farda. All four individuals were accused of working 
under the direction of US intelligence agencies and with the financial support of organizations 
like Soros Fund Management and Georg Soros’ Open Society Institute in preparation of a “soft 
overthrow” of the Islamic Republic, according to Eastern European models. These accusations 
were vehemently refuted even by people close to certain centers of power in the Islamic 
Republic like the Tehran University professor Sadeq Ziba Kalam,114 a former member of the 
Council for the Cultural Revolution and associate of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Furthermore, 
the penal code of the Islamic Republic does not include any definition for a political crime called 
“conspiracy for a soft overthrow of the government” (yet!). 
After being kept in solitary confinement for 100 days, Hale Esfandiari was released from Evin 
prison with a bail of $300,000 and was able to leave Iran on 2 September 2007. She had to agree 
to appear in a television interview, in which she confirmed the accusations of the MOIS against 
herself. Her case shows that the Islamic Republic’s intelligence apparatus is sabotaging existing 
academic exchange relations between US and Iranian universities by scaring off academics in 
US universities from contacts with Iranian civil society and Iranian academics within the 
country.115
                                                 
107 ناﺮﻳا ﯽﺳﺎﻨﺷ ﻪﻌﻣﺎﺟ ﻦﻤﺠﻧا 
108 ناﺮﻳا ﯼدازﺁ ﺖﻀﻬﻧ 
109 ﯽﻣﻼﺳا بﻼﻘﻧا ﻦﻳﺪهﺎﺠﻣ نﺎﻣزﺎﺳ 
110 ﯼرﺎﻳﺪﻨﻔﺳا ﻪﻟﺎه 
111 ﺶﺨﺒﺟﺎﺗ نﺎﻴﮐ 
112 ﯼﺮﮐﺎﺷ ﯽﻠﻋ 
113 ﺎﻤﻴﻈﻋ زﺎﻧﺮﭘ 
114 مﻼﮐ ﺎﺒﻳز قدﺎﺻ 
115 During the summer 2007, the US-based International Society for Iranian Studies (ISIS) and other academic 
organizations concerned with the Middle East and Iran issued internal warnings to their members against 
travelling to the Iranian Republic. 
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Qom, the Computer Capitol of the Islamic Republic116
The city of Qom is the center of the most important religious educational institution117 of the 
Twelver Shiite clergy known as the Howze. In the beginning of his term as supreme religious 
leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei118 commissioned a working group of younger 
seminarians, who already had advanced university degrees, 119  to set the foundation for the 
Computer Centre for Religious Sciences in Qom.120 Among these seminarians was one Taha 
Hashemi,121 who had studied medicine prior to coming to Qom. All members of this group had 
close affinities with the conservative faction within the leadership of the Islamic Republic 
centered around Ayatollah Khamenei. The directors of the new computer center made it a 
priority to persuade older Mullahs of the benefits of computers. The lecturers of the Howze and 
the most senior religious authorities122 were offered computers and IT services at discounted 
prices. At first, this computer center had two departments for hardware and software that were 
later split into two separate institutions. All seminarians were also given the opportunity to pay 
for their computer equipment in installments and attend free computer classes. 
 
 
The Creation of a “Digital Memory” in the Howze 
The “computer center hired a large number of seminarians to electronically save and 
computerize all key texts of “traditional theology,”123 from Islamic law (“Fiqh”) to philosophy. 
This data was later put on CD-ROMs with sophisticated programs and published. Henceforth, all 
key texts of Hadith124 and Elm-el-Rejal,125 which constitute the essential working material of 
religious scholars, were published in CD-ROM format, thereby simplifying theme and keyword 
searches within texts. Gradually, older, conservative clerics were able to overcome their initial 
skepticism about computers. During the first half of the 1990s, most offices of the Howze were 
computerized; among the Twelver Shiite clerics of Iran, the computer became a sign of 
modernity. IT literacy became a symbolic value in the (cultural) race to catch up with the modern 
world. Everything, from theological and didactic contents to the bureaucratic management of the 
Howze and of course the inquisitorial surveillance of clerics by the judiciary, was rationalized 
with information technology. Many senior clerics, like Seyed Javad Shahrestani,126 son-in-law 
and “religious attorney”127 of the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani128  in Qom, gave 
                                                 
116 All information in the section about Qom is based on the following insightful interviews and articles by Mehdi 
Khalaji ﯽﺠﻠﺧ ﯼﺪﻬﻣ: http://www.radiozamaaneh.com/special/2007/04/post_188.html; http://www.bbc.co.uk/persi 
an/iran/story/2005/08/printable/050802_mj-shahr-e-khoda-main.shtml and particularly: http://www.bbc.co.uk/pe 
rsian/iran/story/2005/08/050802_mj-mkhalaji-internet-qom.shtml; See also: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ 
templateC10.php?CID=33. 
117 ﻢﻗ ﮥﻴﻤﻠﻋ ۀزﻮﺣ 
118 ﻪﻴﻘﻓ ﯽﻟو 
119 ﻪﺒﻠﻃ 
120 ﯽﻣﻼﺳا مﻮﻠﻋ ﯼﺮﺗﻮﻴﭙﻣﺎﮐ تﺎﻘﻴﻘﺤﺗ ﺰﮐﺮﻣ 
121 ﯽﻤﺷﺎه ﻪﻃ 
122 ﺪﻴﻠﻘﺗ ﻊﺟاﺮﻣ 
123 ﯽﺘﻨﺳ مﻮﻠﻋ نﻮﺘﻣ 
124 ﺚﻳﺪﺣ; Reports about Sayings and deeds of the prophet of Islam. 
125 ﺚﻳﺪﺣ نﺎﻳوار ،لﺎﺟر ﻢﻠﻋ; Reports about the narrators of these sayings. 
126 ﯽﻧﺎﺘﺳﺮﻬﺷ داﻮﺟ ﺪﻴﺳ 
127 ﯽﻋﺮﺷ ﻞﻴﮐو 
128 ﯽﻧﺎﺘﺴﻴﺳ ﯽﻠﻋ 
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computers as presents to their students and encouraged them to familiarize themselves with the 
internet. 
 
 
Shiite Religious Authorities Discover the Internet 
During the second half of the 1990s, several other companies and institutions besides the 
aforementioned Computer Research Centre for Islamic Sciences were founded in Qom, offering 
IT and internet services. Before the dawn of the internet in Qom, Shiite clerics thought that they 
only lacked the appropriate instruments for the propaganda and dissemination of Islam.129 They 
considered their own interpretation of Islam and their traditional cognitive framework as 
immaculate and perfectly accurate. With this worldview, they “discovered” the internet as an 
appropriate vehicle to disseminate “theological sciences”130 beyond the limits of the Howze in 
Qom. Right at the beginning of the Iranian internet boom at the turn of the millennium, most 
powerful Twelver Shiite religious authorities created their own websites. Among them were the 
ayatollahs Ali Sistani,131 Sheikh Javad Tabrizi,132 Ali Sanei,133 Hossein Nouri Hemadani134 and 
even ultra-conservative elements like Lotfollah Safi Golpaigani.135 Most of these websites are at 
least trilingual. The website of the late Mohammad Fazel Lankarani136 is in 29 languages. 
The website of a “Marja’”137 is his virtual “Beyt,”138 through which his “adherents”139 learn 
about his latest decrees.140 They can access his theological dissertation141 and some personal 
informational about him. They can specifically find out how they can donate money142 to the 
cleric. There is a latent competition between the highest religious authorities for the recruitment 
of “imitators” because high numbers of imitators translate directly into more income from 
endowments. The biographical sections of many virtual “beyts” often contain mystified versions 
of a marja’s life and occasionally even implied allusions to his supernatural healing powers.143 
Some websites contain extensive narratives about non-profit initiatives (for example, the 
building of schools and libraries) under the auspices of an authority as an indirect incentive to the 
“imitators” for more monetary donations. 
                                                 
129 ﻎﻴﻠﺒﺗ 
130 ﯽﺘﻨﺳ مﻮﻠﻋ و فرﺎﻌﻣ 
131 ﯽﻧﺎﺘﺴﻴﺳ ﯽﻠﻋ http://www.sistani.org/. 
132 ﺦﻴﺷﯼﺰﻳﺮﺒﺗ داﻮﺟ  http://www.tabrizi.org/. 
133 ﯽﻌﻧﺎﺻ http://www.saanei.org/. 
134 ﯽﻧاﺪﻤه ﯼرﻮﻧ ﻦﻴﺴﺣ http://www.noorihamedani.com. 
135 ﷲا ﻒﻄﻟﯽﻧﺎﮕﻳﺎﭙﻠﮔ ﯽﻓﺎﺻ  http://www.saafi.net/. 
136 ﯽﻧاﺮﮑﻨﻟ ﻞﺿﺎﻓ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ ﺦﻴﺷ http://www.lankarani.net/. 
137 Senior religious authority ﺪﻴﻠﻘﺗ ﻊﺟﺮﻣ 
138 Literally: home, here: headquarters. 
139 ﻠﻘﻣﻦﻳﺪ  
140 ﯼوﺎﺘﻓ ،اﻮﺘﻓ 
141 ﻞﺋﺎﺴﻤﻟا ﺢﻴﺿﻮﺗ 
142 ﯽﻋﺮﺷ ﻩﻮﺟو 
143 قراﻮﺧ و تﺎﻣاﺮﮐ 
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Religious Propaganda and Match Making Agencies through “Web 2.0” 
Apart from those senior religious authorities, some mullahs of medium and lower ranks also host 
rather sophisticated websites. The most interesting websites in this category are the ones by 
Hossein Ansarian144 and the veteran TV preacher Mohsen Qara’ati,145 as they are published in 
seven languages and offer text, audio and video documents, using all available technical 
potentials of “web 2.0”. Some mullahs like Savlanpur Ardebili 146  use their sites as virtual 
matchmaking agencies.147 A large number of websites run by junior level mullahs offer services 
for the temporary marriage “Sighe.”148
 
 
The Increasing Popularity of Religious Blogs 
On 11 October 2005, the first public introductory course about blogging was offered in the city 
of Qom under the auspices of the recently founded Office for the Promotion of Religious 
Blogs.149 Some younger seminarians and mullahs had already started to publish blogs back in 
2001. These religious blogs usually contain almost no personal information about the authors. 
Najaf Lakzayi,150 for example, exclusively publishes specialized texts directly related to his job 
as director of the Research Centre for the Islamic State in Qom.151 It is relatively difficult to find 
any specific information about the daily life and work of clerics and seminarians in religious 
blogs. Compared to “normal” civilian blogs, personal information can only sporadically be found 
between the lines of religious blog entries. 
The language of religious websites usually follows archaic rhetorical rules, which make them 
rather inaccessible for younger, non-religious readers. Religious blogs, on the other hand, tend to 
a more informal style. Religious blogs by conservative and conformist writers are more 
numerous than those by reform-theologians and their sympathizers among seminarians. Blogs by 
reform-theologians are often published under pseudonyms, in obvious fear of possible 
persecution by the regime. Conservative bloggers, however, write under their own names. 
During the eight-year presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) most blogs and websites 
run by seminarians and mullahs from Qom were in clear opposition to the president and his 
reformist political agenda. 
 
 
Reform-Theologians on the Internet 
For a small number of “dissident” reform theologians who live in the Islamic Republic, websites 
are the only possible conduit to publish their writings: Mohsen Kadivar152 publishes his most 
                                                 
144 نﺎﻳرﺎﺼﻧا ﻦﻴﺴﺣ; http://www.erfan.ir/. 
145 ﯽﺘﺋاﺮﻗ ﻦﺴﺤﻣ; http://www.qaraati.net/. 
146 ﯽﻠﻴﺑدرا رﻮﭘ نﻻوﺎﺳ 
147 http://www.ardabili.com/. 
148 ﻪﻐﻴﺻ ؛ﺖﻗﻮﻣ جاودزا See: http://movaghati.com/hamsaryabi.aspx. 
149 ﯽﻨﻳد ﯼﺎﻬﮔﻼﺑو ﻪﻌﺳﻮﺗ ﺮﺘﻓد; See ﻮﮕﺘﺳار مﻼﺳﻻا ﺖﺠﺣ :ﻨﮐ ﻢﻠﻗ ار ﺎه حﻼﺳ ﻪﮐ ﺖﺳا نﺁ ﺖﻗوﻢﻴ  In: http://www.porsojoo.com/?q=fa/ 
node/12419/print; See also: http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,1892562,00.html. 
150 ﯽﻳاز ﮏﻟ ﻒﺠﻧ; http://www.lakzaee.net. 
151 ﻢﻗ ﯽﻣﻼﺳا ﺖﻣﻮﮑﺣ تﺎﻘﻴﻘﺤﺗ ﺰﮐﺮﻣ 
152 رﻮﻳﺪﮐ ﻦﺴﺤﻣ; http://www.kadivar.com. 
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important writings and the latest news about his public appearances bilingually (in Persian and 
English) on his website. Ahmad Qabel153  publishes his theological writings through a blog. 
Hossein Ali Montazeri, who has been under house arrest for nearly 20 years, does not have 
access to any media inside Iran and depends entirely on his website,154 to publish his latest 
decrets and writings. Montazeri’s website is hosted outside the country in order to be safe from 
interference by the state security apparatus. He originally belonged to the inner circle of clerics 
who founded the Islamic Republic and was involved in formulating and adding the sections 
about the Principle of the Leadership of a Religious Authority to the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic.155 As a former student of Ruhollah Khomeini’s who had reached the rank of a grand 
ayatollah himself, Montazeri was the designated successor of the “supreme leader” long before 
he died in early 1989. In the fall of 1988, however, Montazeri publicly protested against the mass 
execution of more than 4,000 political prisoners and subsequently fell into disfavor with the 
Islamic Republic’s leadership. 
Montazeri was the only high-ranking Islamic Republic official who abstained from the highest 
position of power in order to defend his own political opponents (the political prisoners who had 
been incarcerated for opposing “his” state). During the 1990s, Montazeri was under house arrest 
and subject to a total information blockade by the Islamic Republic’s leadership. After the turn of 
the millennium, his followers and particularly his two sons discovered the internet as a great 
opportunity to penetrate the blockade and hence created a website for him. In 2002, Montazeri 
published his memoirs electronically on his website. The memoirs are among the most important 
historical sources about the revolution and the foundation of the Islamic Republic. A consortium 
of Iranian publishers in exile printed the online version of Montazeri’s memoirs with all 
appendices in book format. For Montazeri’s “imitators” and miscellaneous interested readers 
inside Iran, Monztazeri’s website is the only place where they can access his memoirs. This 
website has now been blocked for several years and is only accessible from inside the country 
through proxy servers and anonymizer services. 
In general, filtering seems to be enforced more rigorously in Qom than in any other place inside 
Iran. The primary target of the filtering system in Qom is Persian websites and blogs, because 
most seminarians and mullahs lack the necessary knowledge of foreign languages to benefit from 
other sources of information on the internet. 
 
 
More about the Consequences - Internet Impact on the Howze 
The digitization of all key texts of Islamic law and the most relevant Koran interpretations156 (for 
Twelver Shiites) rationalized the centuries old continuous data preservation process in the Howze. 
Information technology gradually substituted the collective human memory of the Howze with a 
machine based digital memory. This technological complementation of data collection has not 
changed much in the Howze’s traditional cognitive framework. On the contrary, orthodox views 
seem to have solidified themselves through the process of digital rationalization. So far, the 
                                                 
153 ﻞﺑﺎﻗ ﺪﻤﺣا; http://www.aghabel.persianblog.ir/. 
154 http://www.montazeri.org. 
155 ﻪﻴﻘﻓ ﺖﻳﻻو 
156 ﺮﻴﺴﻔﺗ 
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Howze seems to have used the internet in an attempt to primarily to influence the outer world 
rather than being influenced by it. 
 
 
The Internet as an Alternative Space for the Enrichment of Iranian Civil Society 
The foundation and development of the digital daily newspaper ROOZ 
The digital daily news-“paper” ROOZ157 was founded in April 2005; in the meantime, it has 
become one of the most frequently visited sources of political news in the Persian language 
available to exiles on the internet. Although the editors of ROOZ predominantly belong to the 
reformist camp and do not intend to overthrow the Islamic Republic, ROOZ was identified by the 
internet censors of the Islamic Republic as potentially dangerous and was blacklisted. Before it 
was blocked in February 2007, ROOZ had reached daily visitor numbers of over one million, 
60 % of whom came from Iran. On average, each visitor accessed at least three different sections 
of the current issue (for example, the editorial by Masoud Behnoud,158 the satirical column by 
Ebrahim Nabavi159 and one more piece from the review section) and thus spent a relatively long 
time on the ROOZ website.160
The implementation of blocking caused the daily visitor numbers to drop drastically. However, a 
spontaneous grassroots movement of ROOZ readers inside and outside Iran formed within a 
short period of time. With a minimum of financial and logistic resources this grassroots 
movement managed to circumvent the censorship system and make ROOZ accessible to 
thousands of recipients inside the country. The grassroots activists were able to exploit a 
weakness in the Islamic Republic’s filtering system, which controls the access to websites but 
does not affect e-mail traffic. Therefore the regime is not capable of restricting these alternative 
distribution methods in the internet, which function without the knowledge and outside any 
direct control of the ROOZ editorial board. Since February 2007, complete issues of ROOZ are 
sent individually by e-mail to approximately 40,000 readers, using Feedblitz.161 Several younger 
ROOZ subscribers with contacts within the student milieu inside the country forward this 
newsletter edition to thousands of addresses on private mailing lists. A student activist named 
B.Q., who is based in Germany, sends the ROOZ daily newsletter to 20,000 addresses. Many of 
“his” subscribers inside Iran forward ROOZ even farther, making the total number of recipients 
impossible to investigate. 
ROOZ is a digital medium and can be produced and distributed without great logistical and 
financial effort. The editorial board is based outside the country and is not subject to any direct 
danger of censorship or arrest by the Islamic Republic. ROOZ obviously does not need a printing 
house and cannot be blackmailed by the government with its well known tactics such as 
withholding of rationed print paper or a ban on physical distribution of the paper. The editorial 
board consists of six members, who live in five different European and North American cities: 
Masoud Behnoud (editor in chief, London), Hossein Bastani162 (editorial board member and 
                                                 
157 Cf.: http://www.roozonline.com. 
158 دﻮﻨﻬﺑ دﻮﻌﺴﻣ 
159 ﯼﻮﺒﻧ ﻢﻴهاﺮﺑا 
160 All information about ROOZ is based on interviews conducted with the editor in chief Masoud Behnoud on 7, 9 
and 25 August 2007 in London. 
161 See: http://www.feedblitz.com. 
162 ﯽﻧﺎﺘﺳﺎﺑ ﻦﻴﺴﺣ 
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president of the Iran Gooya163), Nushabe Amiri164 and Houshang Assadi165 (editorial board 
members, both in Creteil in the suburbs of Paris), Ebrahim Nabavi (editorial board member and 
satirical columnist, Brussels), Nikahang Kousar166 (cartoonist and graphic artist, Toronto). Until 
early 2007, Hossein Derakhshan (Toronto/Paris) was responsible for the technical aspects of the 
online publication. Afterwards, this job was delegated to a British web designer without any 
knowledge of Persian who works closely with the editor in chief Behnoud in London. 
The editorial board’s work is coordinated entirely in cyberspace: The editors meet every evening 
when the content of each daily issue has been finalized in a private chat room, using Yahoo! 
messenger to decide the hierarchy of themes and choose the headlines. Masoud Behnoud is the 
most professionally experienced member of the ROOZ editorial board.167 The other members of 
the editorial board are up to three generations younger than Behnoud and with the exception of 
Houshang Assadi started their journalistic careers after the revolution of 1979. Noushabe Amiri 
and Houshang Assadi collaborated with the official press outlets of the Communist Tudeh 
Party’s after the revolution.168 The others came from completely different social and political 
backgrounds. Hossein Bastani was among the closest associates of the former president, Khatami, 
responsible for a confidential newsletter that informed the president about the most recent 
international political news and developments. Nikahang Kousar comes from a traditional 
religious family background and started his career as a cartoonist in the mid-1990s in the 
temporary period of relative medial pluralism under Khatami. Ebrahim Nabavi started his 
political career as the interior minister’s deputy for political affairs in the early 1980s, when his 
present-day colleague Assadi was in prison. During the 1980s, he gradually distanced himself 
from the government and became a film critic, satirist and novelist. In the meantime, more than 
50 books by Nabavi are available on the legal Iranian book market, although he has been living 
                                                 
163 ﺎﻳﻮﮔ ناﺮﻳا ﺖﮐﺮﺷ 
164 ﯼﺮﻴﻣا ﻪﺑﺎﺷﻮﻧ 
165 ﯼﺪﺳا ﮓﻨﺷﻮه 
166 ﺮﺛﻮﮐ ﮓﻨهﺁ ﮏﻴﻧ 
167 Masoud Behnoud (born 1946) has been abroad since July 2002. He has more than 40 years of experience as a 
journalist and editor. Before the revolution, he produced eight documentaries, over 100 television shows and 300 
radio programs for the national Iranian television organization and wrote more than 20 books on historical topics. 
During the 1980s, he belonged to the editorial board of the cultural journal Adineh ﻪﻨﻳدﺁ, that was banned in the 
1990s. From July 2002 until early summer 2007 he published a blog named Behnoud-e Digar ﺮﮕﻳد دﻮﻨﻬﺑ. Since 
June 2007 he has a website named www.masoudbehnoud.com. There he re-published his articles from ROOZ, 
E’temad-e Melli (www.etemademelli.ir), the Persian online service of BBC, etc. His actual blog entries are 
published on the same website under the rubric Shab Neveshteha ﺎه ﻪﺘﺷﻮﻧ ﺐﺷ (http://masoudbehnoud.com/web 
log). 
168 Before the 1979 revolution, Houshang Assadi was a member of the editorial board of Keyhan daily newspaper. 
After revolution and the opening of SAVAK archives his name appeared on the list of SAVAK’s informers. The 
communist Tudeh Party defended Assadi and claimed to have sent him on a mission to “infiltrate” SAVAK. In 
1983, Assadi was arrested together with a large number of leading members of the Tudeh Party’s central 
apparatus by the Iranian Republic and was released at the end of the 1980s. This time, he allegedly became a 
collaborator of the Iranian Republic’s internal security organizations. In the 1980s, a substantial number of 
inflammatory articles against secular intellectuals as the “fifth columns” of the “cultural invasion” of the Islamic 
Republic were published in Keyhan-e Havayi ﻴﮐﯽﻳاﻮه نﺎﻬ .After his relocation to Paris und the beginning of his 
journalistic activities for ROOZ, Assadi was accused by several ex-political prisoners from the 1980s, including 
Iraj Mesdaghi ﯽﻗاﺪﺼﻣ جﺮﻳا of being a collaborator of the Iranian Republic’s intelligence apparatus. These 
accusations do not seem to have affected Assadi’s standing within the ROOZ editorial board. Cf. Mesdaghi’s 
article ﯽﮕﻨهﺮﻓ ﻢﺟﺎﻬﺗ حﺮﻃ و ﯼﺪﺳا ﮓﻨﺷﻮه ؟ﺪﻧدﺮﮐ ﺰﻴﺗ ار ﺖﺴﻣ نﺎﻴﮕﻧز ﻎﻴﺗ ﯽﻧﺎﺴﮐ ﻪﭼ . : http://www.arashmag.com/content/view/ 
646/46/
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in exile since April 2003. As journalists, Behnoud, Nabavi and Bastani spent several periods in 
prison during the 1990s. None of the ROOZ editors has ever been able to travel to Iran without 
risking arrest. In early August 2007, Soheil Asefi169 and two other ROOZ correspondents, who 
wrote under pseudonyms, were arrested in Tehran. 
The foundation of ROOZ stems from an initiative by the Dutch Member of Parliament Farah 
Karimi.170 In 2005, she was the driving force behind a bill that obligated the Dutch government 
to invest 20 million Euros in support of a Persian satellite television project outside Iran. The 
present team of the ROOZ editorial board, with two additional individuals named Mohsen 
Sazegara 171  and Said Razavi Faqih, 172  were the only applicants to carry out the satellite 
television project. Later on, Sazegara and Razavi Faqih separated from the group. 
The bill provoked an extreme reaction by the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic’s pressure 
on the Dutch Association of Industrialists led to the government’s capitulation and decision to 
put the original project on hold. Later on, a new plan was developed to distribute the 20 million 
Euros amongst several smaller projects, which should all be related to promoting the free flow of 
information to Iranian civil society and the promotion of media pluralism. One of these projects 
was the Amsterdam-based satellite and internet radio station Radio Zamaneh, under the current 
directorship of the ex-BBC producer Mehdi Jami. Behnoud and his associates decided for a 
digital daily newspaper. 
At first, the founders of ROOZ intended to buy the Iranian internet news gateway Gooya173 with 
the help of a Dutch NGO. The founder of Gooya, Farshad Bayan,174 was leaving Brussels to 
work for the expanding online section of BBC’s Persian service. Gooya is a unique Persian 
internet media gateway that lists a large variety of digital periodicals, websites of political parties 
and organizations with different orientations, thematic websites, internet radio and satellite 
stations from in- and outside Iran all beside each other in its rubrics. Many professional 
journalists in Iran begin their daily work in their offices by logging on to Gooya and Gooya 
News (with the help of proxy servers) and using the daily updated link compilation in Gooya to 
follow the domestic and international news.175
A fusion between the ROOZ initiative and Gooya would have been plausible, as both of them 
aimed at bringing together the Persian media from within and outside of the country. Therefore, 
the company, which later published the digital daily newspaper ROOZ, was named Iran Gooya. 
The deal with Gooya fell through but the company, directed by Hossein Bastani, kept its original 
                                                 
169 ﯽﻔﺻﺁ ﻞﻴﻬﺳ 
170 Farah Karimi left Iran in 1979 and came to Germany as a student. Later, she relocated to the Netherlands, where 
she became active in the Dutch Green Party.  Ms Karimi, whose sister was executed by the Islamic Republic 
during the early 1980s, always remained interested in the human rights situation in Iran throughout the eight 
years she served as a Dutch MP. 
171 ارﺎﮔزﺎﺳ ﻦﺴﺤﻣ; Founding member of the IRGC in the early 1980s and later dissident, left Iran in 2001 for London 
and later moved to the US where he has been working as a political consultant for various Washington think 
tanks and for the Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre in New Haven in the past years. He regularly 
appears as a political commentator on VOA’s Persian satellite and internet TV. 
172 ﻪﻴﻘﻓ ﯼﻮﺿر ﺪﻴﻌﺳ; A PhD candidate in Political Science in Paris, he is currently the president of the European 
Islamic Student Associations (of Iranian students) ﺎﭘورا رد نﺎﻳﻮﺠﺸﻧاد ﯽﻣﻼﺳا ﯼﺎﻬﻨﻤﺠﻧا ﮥﻳدﺎﺤﺗا ﯼﺰﮐﺮﻣ ﯼارﻮﺷ. 
173 ﺎﻳﻮﮔ; See: http://www.gooya.com
174 نﺎﻴﺑ دﺎﺷﺮﻓ 
175 This information was provided by the Tehran correspondent of an Italian daily newspaper in an interview on 
August 1, 2007. 
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name and was registered in Paris. ROOZ is sponsored with an annual subsidy of 300,000 Euros 
by the Dutch NGO HIVOS. All regular editors work for a minimal monthly salary of 
approximately 1300 Euros. Occasionally, some freelance collaborators also get paid a symbolic 
honorarium for writing articles or translating pieces for the English section of ROOZ. 
Generally, the future of ROOZ is guaranteed more by the idealism of its writers than the financial 
aid of the Dutch NGO. The ROOZ editorial board brings together younger and older journalists, 
members of the current student movement inside the country, exiled activists from various 
generations and different political backgrounds and is distributed on a large scale through a 
number of decentralized grass roots initiatives. The Islamic Republic’s internet censors are 
extremely sensitive about ROOZ, because it represents the kind of media pluralism that the 
Islamic Republic has been trying to prevent since its own foundation. 
Before the internet era and the foundation of the news gateway Gooya, the number of Persian 
journals published regularly outside the country was limited. The largest periodicals were the 
weekly papers Keyhan176 and Nimrooz177 in London and Shahrvand178 in Toronto as well as a 
large number of (amateurish) local and regional community papers that never reached 
international distribution. The Washington-based Iran Times weekly newspaper was first 
published in the late 1960s but remained practically unknown among Iranians in Europe. 
Journalists abroad had to depend on these papers and on a small number of political and cultural 
monthly journals like Rahavard179 and Par in the US, Rouzegar-e no180 in Paris and Kaveh181 in 
Munich, all produced and distributed internationally under extremely complicated circumstances. 
Great logistical obstacles have also caused the internationally far-flung diaspora communities to 
have only delayed access to Iran-specific sources of information from within and outside of the 
country. With the beginning of the internet era and the foundation of news gateways like Gooya 
and digital newspapers like ROOZ, the Persian diaspora’s communities grew together. They also 
gained access to a large number of digitized media including newspapers, official government 
TV and radio stations from inside the country, which until the late 1990s were mostly out of their 
reach. The immediate character of cyber-journalism and digital publication led to the 
disappearance of the typical “time lag” for news to reach the Iranian diaspora. 
 
 
Cyber Journalism from Exile – About Ebrahim Nabavi 
In early 2000, Ebrahim Nabavi was put on trial in Teheran and received yet another prison 
sentence because of something he wrote in his satirical column in a Tehran daily newspaper. 
After being released from prison, he decided to publish parts of his writings on the internet. Like 
many other journalists, he first thought the internet would enable him to remove himself 
completely from the danger of being censored and persecuted by the government. With the help 
of the award-winning Iranian pioneer web designer Reza Abedini,182 whom he knew from his 
                                                 
176 نﺎﻬﻴﮐ; See: http://www.kayhanlondon.com. 
177 زوﺮﻤﻴﻧ; See: http://www.nimrooz.com. 
178 ﺪﻧوﺮﻬﺷ; See: http://shahrvand.ca. 
179 دروﺁ ﻩر 
180 ﻮﻧ رﺎﮔزور 
181 ﻩوﺎﮐ 
182 ﯽﻨﻳﺪﺑﺎﻋ ﺎﺿر; See: http://www.rezaabedini.com/. 
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publishing house Rouzane,183 Nabavi created his first website www.nabavionline.com toward the 
end of 2007.184 This website was, as its name suggested, built around Ebrahim Nabavi as a 
person and served as a platform to publish a variety of his political, literary and satirical writings 
as well as audio files with music clips and commentary and comedic performances by Nabavi. 
On the day of its inauguration, Nabavionline had approximately 4,000 visitors; afterwards this 
increased steadily until he had about 15,000 visitors per day. At that time, although the internet 
still had not turned into a mass phenomenon in Iran, Nabavi primarily targeted readers inside the 
country. In that context, these numbers were relatively high. Nabavi published his satirical 
column on Nabavionline and simply asked those newspapers that printed the material off the 
internet, to transfer a specific honorarium into his account. At any given time, he was publishing 
around 20 commercial advertisement banners on his site, which generated the equivalent of 
4,000 to 5,000 Euros per month. Nabavionline was and probably still is the first and only 
cultural-literary website in Persian that became a steady source of income for its editor. However, 
all technical facilities and people involved in maintaining the site were in Tehran; this made the 
editor vulnerable to possible attempts of blackmailing by the government. Eventually, in April 
2003, Nabavi left Iran to escape further persecution by the judiciary. From Brussels he 
maintained contact with his webmaster and continued publishing his material on Nabavionline. 
In September, 2003, upon instructions from the Tehran “press prosecutor,” Said Mortazavi,185 
the webmaster suddenly ceased all contact with Nabavi, blocked his access to the website and 
withheld all text, audio and picture files, none of which Nabavi had copied to take with him on 
his way to exile. The Nabavionline site was thereby shut down from one day to the next. 
Nabavi’s initial idealization of the internet as a safe haven from government censorship and 
persecution proved to be an illusion. 
Farshad Bayan, who was then the owner and publisher of Gooya in Brussels, offered Nabavi an 
exclusive page on Gooya News, which was under his sole editorial control. Within a short period 
of time, this page reached daily visitor numbers of 15,000 to 18,000. At the same time, Nabavi 
started working for the Persian online services of Deutsche Welle186  and Voice of America 
(VOA),187 using their satellite and online facilities to publish his satirical text and audio material. 
At present he belongs to the editorial board of ROOZ, produces a weekly video program for the 
online service of Radio Zamaneh and still continues to write two to three articles per day under 
various pseudonyms for newspapers and journals published inside Iran. He maintains all of these 
professional contacts using the internet. Some editions of Nabavi’s online TV program, E’teraf 
(“Confession”),188 which he published until the end of 2005 for VOA’s Persian program, are 
“immortalized” on YouTube. E’teraf was a parody of television programs produced by the 
MOIS, in which prominent imprisoned dissidents were dragged in front of TV cameras and 
forced to confess to all political and moral “crimes” of which they had been accused by state 
security organizations. 
                                                 
183 ﻪﻧزور تارﺎﺸﺘﻧا 
184 All information in this section is based on interviews with Ebrahim Nabavi on 10 Monday 13 August 2007. 
185 ﯼﻮﻀﺗﺮﻣ ﺪﻴﻌﺳ 
186 In the meantime, this service has been expanded with a large financial and personnel investment: Cf.: 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/0,,641,00.html. 
187 See: http://www.voanews.com/persian. 
188 فاﺮﺘﻋا; See, for example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLxUye39yc4. 
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In October 2004, Nabavi started a graphically and technically simple website named 
Doomdam,189 where he published his literary and cultural criticism. Soon after its inauguration, 
Doomdam was blocked in Iran. Some of the pieces documented on Doomdam had been 
previously published in Nabavi’s weekly program on Radio Zamaneh in audio or video format. 
In the meantime, Nabavi has given up his exclusive page on the Gooya site. Gooya has now been 
blocked in Iran for several years and no longer functions as a political communications hub 
between the political scenes inside and outside the country. In the beginning, about 45 % of 
Doodam’s readers were from inside Iran and 55 % from abroad. The blocking of the site caused 
the daily visitor numbers of Doomdam to drop from 5,000 to 2,500 to 3,000. 
The internet facilitates communication between exiled journalists and their audiences inside and 
outside the country. It cannot, however, replace live contact between the two sides. In the case of 
Nabavi, who only writes about Iran and derives his material from political and social issues from 
within the Iranian society, the isolation of exile led to a gradual thematic impoverishment of his 
writings for which even the advantages of the internet cannot compensate. 
 
 
The Cyber Radio Station Zamaneh – An Experiment in Participatory Citizens’ Journalism 
from Exile 
The Amsterdam based Radio Zamaneh would not be able to exist without the internet. Since 
June 2006, this radio station has been working under the directorship of Mehdi Jami190 and the 
supervision of a board of directors consisting of journalists and politicians in the Netherlands. 
Radio Zamaneh was founded under the guidance of a Dutch NGO named “Press Now.” Radio 
Zamaneh was originally one of the “smaller” projects that grew out of the initiative of the Dutch 
MP Farah Karimi to support the free flow of information into Iranian civil society and promote 
media pluralism amongst Iranians. Similar to ROOZ, Radio Zamaneh established itself through 
the collaboration of a core of professional journalists and administrators with the support of a 
grassroots movement of “citizen (radio) journalists.” There are currently 14 journalists, 
technicians and administrators working at Radio Zamaneh’s head quarters in Amsterdam. The 
station also has 150 paid contributors who live in 30 different cities around the world, only two 
of them inside Iran. Some contributors who reside in the neighboring European countries 
regularly travel to Amsterdam to record their programs. Others record their programs using 
computer equipment and send them in as e-mail attachments or upload them directly onto the 
radio’s server. Among the freelance contributors are several renowned exiled authors like 
Shahrnoush Parsipour191 from Berkeley, Reza Daneshvar192 from Paris, Abbas Ma’rufi193 from 
Berlin, with their own weekly programs and specific regular audiences within the virtual 
community around Radio Zamaneh. These are all writers, whose works are strictly censored and 
banned inside Iran. The distribution of their writings abroad is limited by the logistic problems of 
Persian book distribution abroad. Without the online community of Radio Zamaneh, many 
younger Iranians would have never even had heard their names. 
                                                 
189 Cf.: http://www.doomdam.com. 
190 ﯽﻣﺎﺟ ﯼﺪﻬﻣ; All information in this section is based on an interview with Mehdi Jami on 9 August 2007. 
191 رﺎﭘ شﻮﻧﺮﻬﺷرﻮﭘ ﯽﺳ  
192 رﻮﺸﻧاد ﺎﺿر 
193 ﯽﻓوﺮﻌﻣ سﺎﺒﻋ 
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Mehdi Jami, who himself started working for Radio Zamaneh on 1 June 2006, found the radio’s 
central staff through an advertisement and screening process that partly took place in Turkey and 
targeted mostly younger Iranian journalists from inside Iran. In the first week of July 2006, a 
workshop was organized in Amsterdam during which the future contributors were familiarized 
with the general mission of the radio station and the principles of “citizen journalism.” They 
subsequently formulated the founding Manifesto of Radio Zamaneh194 together. Immediately 
after the completion of the workshop, Radio Zamaneh started a 40 day long trial period. 
Programs were written and recorded with computers and broadcast over the internet. 
Starting on 1 September 2006 (on the occasion of the 100th the anniversary of the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution), Radio Zamaneh gained satellite access and started broadcasting on 
short wave on 7 September. Its recording studio was officially opened on 11 Sepember 2006. In 
the beginning, the program consisted of two hours of features and two hours of music. Since 
January 2007, one additional hour of features is produced daily in Sweden. Every daily program 
is broadcast between 6:00 pm - 9:00 pm Amsterdam time on shortwave and through live internet 
feed. Later, most features remain accessible for the public in the archives of the radio’s extensive 
website. Once every week, Radio Zamaneh broadcasts a program named Radio Hamayesh,195 
with reports from public events in the Tehran House of Artists196 and the evening events of the 
journal Bokhara.197 On weekends, Radio Zamaneh offers smaller community radio stations like 
Ghasedak198 in Zurich the opportunity to broadcast their programs through its facilities and reach 
an audience beyond their small Iranian diaspora community in Switzerland. 
 
 
Literary Communication on the Internet through Blogs 
Reza Ghassemi (Paris), the Founder of Persian Cyber Literature 
On 10 August 2001, the Paris-based exile Iranian author and musician Reza Ghassemi199 was the 
first Iranian writer to expand the literary communication with his audience inside Iran and in the 
Iranian diaspora into cyberspace.200 He was the first Iranian internet author who published an 
online journal on his website (without using special software and templates) and therefore should 
be considered the first Persian blogger. Using the internet, Ghassemi re-published a number of 
his plays, short stories and novels in electronic format. He also started writing a new novel in 
electronic format. Ghassemi has been living in Paris since the 1980s without ever having 
travelled back to Iran. Parts of his writings have been published in Iran with the permission of 
the Iranian Republic’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. He also publishes some of his 
work in Persian through Editions Khavaran 201  and the French translations through Editions 
Phébus, both in Paris. Ghassemi’s Persian writings have achieved vast distribution through the 
internet. Until it was filtered and blocked in February 2005, Ghassemi’s website had 4,000 daily 
                                                 
194 See: http://radiozamaneh.org/tmp/zamaneh.pdf. 
195 ﺶﻳﺎﻤه ﻮﻳدار 
196 ناﺪﻨﻣﺮﻨه ﮥﻧﺎﺧ 
197 ارﺎﺨﺑ ﯼﺎﻬﺒﺷ 
198 ﮎﺪﺻﺎﻗ ﻮﻳدار; http://www.ghasedak.ch. 
199 ﯽﻤﺳﺎﻗ ﺎﺿر 
200 Cf.: www.rezaghassemi.org and its literary supplement Davaat تاود at http://www.rezaghassemi.org/davaat. 
201 ناروﺎﺧ تارﺎﺸﺘﻧا 
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visitors, with 70 % from inside Iran. Afterward filtering began, the visitor numbers fell to 
approximately 1,500 per day.202
Reza Ghassemi’s initiative to establish an interactive relationship with his readers is of historical 
importance. He was the first Iranian writer who involved his worldwide readers in the creation 
process of one of his works and established a relationship through dialogue with them. In his 
online diary, readers could follow up on the daily progress of one of his latest novels.203 As he 
had disabled the online comment function on his site, he received feedback from his readers 
mostly through personal e-mails. Occasionally some fragments of the novel were commented 
upon in other blogs. He incorporated some of these reader responses in the further development 
of the text. His novel had two other provisional titles, 204  which he changed in continuous 
dialogue with his readers. The printed version of the novel, published in August 2007 by 
Editions Khavaran, contains an appendix that documents the meta texts about the novel from his 
blog and from the communication with his readers. 
The website www.rezaghassemi.org also contains a supplement under the address 
www.rezaghassemi.org/davaat, through which other exiled writers re-publish their works in 
electronic format. The electronic publication allows them to reach a larger audience in the 
Iranian diaspora and inside Iran.205 Davaat is a virtual publishing house that allows younger 
authors like Mariam Hole,206 who became known as in the exile literary scene, to make their 
works known to the Iranian audience within the country. Despite its having been blocked since 
February 2005, Reza Ghassemi’s website is still accessed by users from inside Iran through 
various proxy servers. 
 
 
The Author Mahshid Amirshahi and Her Rediscovery by the Iranian Audience through 
the Internet 
Since 2003, the internet has been instrumental in re-establishing the disrupted literary 
communication between the exiled Iranian author Mahshid Amirshahi 207  in Paris and her 
worldwide audience. In 1979, Mahshid Amirshahi was – with the exception of Mostafa 
Rahimi 208  – the only intellectual who, in the middle of the revolutionary euphoria, warned 
against Khomeini’s rising theocratic absolutism. Until 1979, she was known to Iranians as a 
short story writer and translator. Shortly after the Islamic Republic came to power, Amirshahi 
left Iran and moved to Paris, where she became engaged in the exile resistance organization209 of 
                                                 
202 This information is based on an interview with Reza Ghassemi on 14 August 2007 in Puteaux outside of Paris. 
203 ﺪﻧﺪﻧاﻮﺨﻴﻣ ﺎه ﻩﺮﺑ ﻪﮐ ﯼدرو 
204 ﭼﯽﻳودﺎﺟ رﺎﺗ ﻪﺳ نﺁ ﺎﺗ ﻪﻠﭘ ﻞﻬ , later سﺎﻧرﺎﭙﻧﻮﻣ جﺮﺑ و ﻪﻧاﻮﻳد 
205 The novel ﺲﻳرﺎﭘ رد ﯽﻓرﺎﻋ (“A Mystic in Paris”) by the exiled author Kamran Behnia was published in 2005 in 
Abbas Ma’rufi’s Gardoon Publishing House نودﺮﮔ تارﺎﺸﺘﻧا in Berlin but faced logistical distribution problems 
and did not reach a large audience. Six months after the print version, an electronic edition was published on 
Davaat and only then, the novel was acknowledged by critics inside Iran. The novel never would have received 
an official license by the Iranian Republic’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to be published officially 
inside Iran. 
206 ﻪﻟﻮه ﻢﻳﺮﻣ 
207 ا ﺪﻴﺸﻬﻣﯽهﺎﺷﺮﻴﻣ  
208 ﯽﻤﻴﺣر ﯽﻔﻄﺼﻣ 
209 ناﺮﻳا ﯽﻠﻣ ﺖﻣوﺎﻘﻣ ﺖﻀﻬﻧ; See: http://www.namir.info. 
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Shapour Bakhtiar. 210  During her exile years, Mahshid Amirshahi wrote five novels and 
numerous Essays and political articles,211 which were all printed by publishing houses outside 
Iran.212  In 1988, after Ruhollah Khomeini issued a death warrant against the writer Salman 
Rushdie, Amirshahi became part of a group of exiled Iranian writers who founded an 
international committee for the defense of Rushdie. While Rushdie has been under constant 
police surveillance since the death warrant, the Iranian members of this committee have never 
had any protection against threats by terrorists sent by the Islamic Republic. The Islamic 
Republic reacted to Amirshahi’s engagement with a general ban of her works to the extent that 
even her name was not allowed to be mentioned in books and journal articles inside Iran. 
Through these measures, Mahshid Amirshahi gradually became unknown to younger Iranians 
who grew up in the Islamic Republic during the past 25 years; the Islamic Republic managed to 
temporarily erase her name from the collective short term memory of Iranians. 
This situation changed with the beginning of the internet era. A group of Amirshahi’s readers 
built a website for her,213 making a large selection of her work available online. Since 2006, 
Mahshid Amirshahi appeared several times in television programs214 of Voice of America’s 
online and satellite TV service,215 where she was interviewed on a variety of political topics, for 
example on the anniversary of the referendum for the foundation of the Islamic Republic in 
March 1979. During these interviews, Mahshid Amirshahi’s web and e-mail addresses were 
shown in captions underneath the video images. This “advertisement” increased the visitor 
numbers on her website to more than 20,000 per day. She also received thousands of personal e-
mails from viewers of VOA’s online and satellite programs, who had just recently become 
familiar with her work. 
One of Mahshid Amirshahi’s rare public appearances and readings was on 4 August 2006 in 
London, 216  where two conference panels were dedicated to her. Several video clips of her 
readings were recorded during the panel meetings and broadcast on YouTube on the same 
evening. Within less than 24 hours, these clips were advertised in a number of Persian blogs and 
accessed more than 30,000 times. 
 
 
The “Functional Expansion” of the Internet and Blogs in Iran 
The systematic homogenization of the media forced many members of the younger urban middle 
classes and intelligentsia to search in the internet for whatever the state-controlled media was 
denying them. At the same time, internet chat rooms developed into places of anonymous and 
therefore secure social encounters between young men and women and users from different 
social class backgrounds, for example from the northern and southern parts of the capital. Under 
“normal” circumstances of life in the Islamic Republic, due to omnipresent police surveillance 
                                                 
210 رﺎﻴﺘﺨﺑ رﻮﭘﺎﺷ 
211 ﻪﺸﻴﺑ راﺰه ،ﻮﻧﺎﺑﺮﻬﺷ ﻞﺴﻋ ﻩﺎﻣ ،ﺮﻴﺧ مﺪﻗ ﻩدد ،نﺎﺧ سﺎﺒﻋ ﯽﺳوﺮﻋ ،ﺮﻔﺳ رد ،ﺮﻀﺣ رد 
212 Ketab Corporation بﺎﺘﮐ ﺖﮐﺮﺷ and Nashr-e Ketab-e Sohrab  ﺮﺸﻧ بﺎﺘﮐ باﺮﻬﺳ in Los Angeles and Baran Publishers 
ﺮﺸﻧ نارﺎﺑ  in Stockholm. 
213 Compare: http//www.amirshahi.org. 
214 http://www.voanews.com/persian/roundtableram.cfm?CFID=187226117&CFTOKEN=24544692. 
215 http://www.voanews.com/persian/. 
216 The 6th biennial conference of the International Society for Iranian Studies (ISIS) from 3 to 5 August 2006 at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. 
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and the permanent pressure of traditional repressive social control mechanisms that impair social 
interaction beyond certain class boundaries, these virtual companions would never be able to 
meet and interact. 
In the same process, blogs developed into efficient instruments in the hands of the members of 
the fragmented and closed Iranian society to express their desire to communicate amongst each 
other openly. Writing blogs does not require any journalistic training. Every young person with 
basic knowledge of computers and a certain writing talent can become a blogger. Blogs can be 
written under pseudonyms and bloggers can rely on a range of security measures – such as the 
use of gratis services and proxy servers – to keep their identities secret even in a police state like 
the Islamic Republic. This anonymity saved them from persecution by the state and from 
repressive moral judgment by the society at large. There are even, for instance, several blogs like 
Hamzaad,217 through which Iranian gays and lesbians write about themselves. This kind of open 
communication about a taboo subject would not have been possible without the anonymity of the 
internet. 
Iranian blogs are a result of the cultural assimilation of this medium in contemporary Iranian 
socio-culture and therefore they share a number of common features with the Iranian society of 
today. At the time of the Islamic revolution, the total number of Iranians was about 35 million. In 
the meantime, this number has exceeded 70 million, which means that more than half of all 
Iranians were born after 1979 and are under 30 years old. These demographic features of Iranian 
society are reflected in Iranian blogs. By the same token, certain behavioral characteristics of 
today’s Iranian youth can be followed in their use of the internet and blogs. 
Today’s urban middle class young Iranians seem to be particularly interested in fashion trends, 
especially in clothes and music. In a similar way, young Iranian internet users develop sudden 
preferences for certain internet services and communication methods, for example, Orkut and 
Yahoo! Messenger and chat services. 
 
 
Observations about Persian Blog Language 
The language of Persian blogs is predominated by the sociolect218 of today’s Iranian youth. It 
does not follow the traditional rhetorical rules of standard written Persian and floats between 
written and spoken registers. Younger bloggers do not, for instance, observe the linguistic 
honorific codes of written Persian communication. The Persian linguistic community in Iran is 
diglossic, i.e., there is a remarkable difference between the spoken colloquial and the written 
registers of the language. For centuries, the definition of norms for written Persian prose was 
controlled and defined by an educated minority of “professional writers,” who were usually in 
the service of courts. The hermetic Persian writing style of court scribes was for the most part 
incomprehensible for the vast majority of the speakers of Persian. The Constitutional Revolution 
of 1905-1911 democratized the linguistic culture in the Iranian society because it reduced the gap 
between the written and spoken registers. Pioneers of democratic linguistic culture like Ali 
                                                 
217 See: http://hamzaaad.blogspot.com. 
218 A sociolect is a dialect used by a social group or a variety of speech that is used by a particular social class or 
group. 
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Akbar Dehkhoda219 used the colloquial register and even elements of regional dialects in their 
socio-critical writings and thereby changed the norms. 
One hundred years after the Constitutional Revolution, the Persian writing style of the internet 
era has further removed the sharp limits between the written and spoken registers. This new style 
is not defined by individuals like Dehkhoda but by a mass of unidentifiable internet users. 
Stylistic changes can been observed in the choice of words and expressions, the invention of new 
idiomatic expressions, the syntactic structure of sentences and in the different pragmatic use or 
even the total lack of certain “honorific” codes. 
The syntax of Persian blog language generally tends to be simple, i.e. sentences are 
“paratactic.” 220  Spelling and stylistic “mistakes” seem to be used intentionally as stylistic 
features. During the past few years, a certain Persian sociolect has emerged in Iranian chat room 
of Yahoo. This sociolect is the “lingua franca” of all users independent from their social class, 
gender and ethnic origin. It is a version of today’s Persian youth language, scattered with code 
words and written in short, often incomplete sentences using the Latin alphabet. The Persian 
language of blogs, internet chat rooms and even text messaging on mobile phones has produced a 
number of new code words and cryptic idiomatic expressions221 reminiscent of the contemporary 
“secret colloquial youth language.” In the meantime, several socio-linguistic studies have 
explored this phenomenon.222
Since the beginning of the computer era in Iran, the Academy of Persian Language and 
Literature223 in Tehran has systematically worked on the creation of a terminologically stringent 
Persian special language for information technology. The academy regularly publishes lists of 
recommended new words and rules for spelling, style and translation. A large number of the 
academy’s new invented words are recommendations for technical terms in the special language 
of information technology. 
Recently, Mahmoud Ahmadnejad’s cabinet declared the “Academy”’s terminological and 
stylistic recommendations as obligatory rules for all internet communications, including blogs 
and websites.224 It is questionable whether such a bureaucratic act can be enforced outside the 
government apparatus. It is, however, remarkable that for the first time since the foundation of 
the Islamic Republic a government has interfered directly in language regulation matters, 
apparently out of concern for the fate of written Persian language. Interestingly, a number of 
language critics and purists outside the government have expressed similar concerns about the 
degeneration of the written language in the internet.225 The majority of young bloggers show no 
interest in these regulations, as they are constantly looking for ways to demonstrate their 
disobedience toward the state’s authority. Intentional diversions from the rules of written 
                                                 
219 اﺪﺨهد ﺮﺒﮐا ﯽﻠﻋ 
220 Clauses joined without using conjunctions; the combination of clauses or phrases without the use of conjunctions 
such as “and” or “so,” e.g. in “He saved my life – he deserves a medal.” 
221 See, for example: ﺮﮕﻴﺟ نﺰﺑدﺎﺑ = ﮏﻴﻧﻮﺳﺎﻧﺎﭘ؛دﻮﺸﻴﻣ ﻩﺪﻨﻨﮐ ﺖﺒﻴﻏ ﻪﻠﻤﺟ زا ﯽﺧﺮﺑ لد نﺪﺷ ﮏﻨﺧ ﺚﻋﺎﺑ ﻪﮐ ندز فﺮﺣ ﯽﺧﺮﺑ ﺮﺳ ﺖﺸﭘ ،ﺖﺒﻴﻏ
 = ندﺮﺑ نﺎﺳاﺮﺧ ﻪﺑ ﺮﺧ ؛ماﺪﻧا شﻮﺧ و زﺎﻧ ﺮﺘﺧد =ﻦﻔﺧ ؛ندﺮﺑ نﺎﻣﺮﮐ ﻪﺑ ﻩﺮﻳز = ؛ﯽﻧﺪﻳد و ﺐﻟﺎﺟ ،ﺰﻴﮕﻧا ﻦﻴﺴﺤﺗ و بﻮﺧ ،ﮎﺎﻨﺳﺮﺗ ،ﯽﻟﺎﻋ
 ﻢﺴﻴﻟﺎﻤﺘﺳد = ﺶﺘﻳﺎﺳ ﻮﺗ ﻢﺘﻓر ؛ﯽﺳﻮﻠﭘﺎﭼ ﮓﻨهﺮﻓ=ﻦﺘﻓر ﯽﺴﮐ ﺦﻧ ﻮﺗ  .ﺦﻟا.  
222 Compare. دﻮﻤﺤﻣ ،ﯽﻣاﺮﮐا :ﯽﻣدﺮﻣ تﺎﻃﺎﺒﺗرا ﯽﺳﺎﻨﺷ مدﺮﻣ . ناﺮﻬﺗ1386دﻮﻤﺤﻣ ،ﯽﻣاﺮﮐا ؛ :ﯽﻧﺎﻣدﻮﺧ تﺎﻃﺎﺒﺗرا ﯽﺳﺎﻨﺷ مدﺮﻣ . ناﺮﻬﺗ1386 .
ﺪﻴﺸﻬﻣ ،ﯼﺮﻴﺸﻣ :نﺎﻧاﻮﺟ تﺎﻃﺎﺒﺗرا ﮓﻨهﺮﻓ . ناﺮﻬﺗ1386 .ﯼﺪﻬﻣ ،ﯽﺋﺎﻤﺳ :ﯽﻔﺨﻣ نﺎﺑر تﺎﻃﺎﺒﺗرا ﮓﻨهﺮﻓ . ناﺮﻬﺗ1384.  
223 ﺑز نﺎﺘﺴﮕﻨهﺮﻓﯽﺳرﺎﻓ بدا و نﺎ ; Cf.: http://www.persianacademy.ir/. 
224 Cf.: http://www.persianacademy.ir/UserFiles/Image/word03/h0203.pdf. 
225 http://ashouri.malakut.org/archives/2007/04/post_42.shtml. 
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language are a matter of identity for rebellious young bloggers who wish to free themselves from 
the burden of tradition. 
 
 
The Emancipation of the Individual from the Collective: The “Positive Ego-Centrism” of 
Blogs 
Blogs seem to have triggered a general trend toward individualism in the political culture of Iran. 
This is a new and positive form of “ego-centrism,” completely different from the modesty and 
self-denial typical of the old political culture of Iran, which certainly has its roots in religious 
mysticism. During the 1960s and 70s and in the immediate post-1979 revolution era, political 
engagement usually meant involvement in organizations and parties. In the pre-revolution years, 
all political organizations and interest groups except the official Rastakhiz Party226 were illegal 
and could only exist as underground movements or in exile. The entire left of the political 
spectrum consisted of factions that—due to their militant approaches—could only work as 
conspiratorial organizations with semi-legal “outlets” (in form of oppositional pseudo-student 
organizations) abroad. In most cases, the intellectual and political leaders of these organizations 
were anonymous and it was not clear through which procedures and with which qualifications 
they had become leaders. The authors of these organizations’ various publications never signed 
their pieces with their own names and remained unknown as individuals. Most of these 
organizations did not even have published political programs and publicly accessible statutes.227 
They attracted and recruited their body of activists through a highly mystified emotional process, 
rather than by arguments and rational thinking. The mass of individual “sympathizers” dissolved 
in the collective and was subject to the authority of an entity of faceless, out-of-reach leaders. 
Simple activists remained unnamed, unless they lost their lives in the course of political action. 
In the immediate post-revolution era, the Islamic Republic’s violence took the lives of thousands 
of leftist activists in waves of torture and execution. Their individual names and pictures were 
published posthumously in books and journals, almost as if those parties wanted to gain political 
capital from the number of “their martyrs.” The inherent individualism of blogs terminated this 
tradition of self denial and collectivism in the political culture of Iran. In a way, blogs are 
symbols for the emancipation of the individual from the force of the “collective” and from 
patriarchal traditional power structures. 
 
 
The Functional Expansion of Persian Blogs and What Can Be Expected from Them 
The functional expansion of Persian blogs is a reaction to social restrictions imposed by a 
totalitarian theocratic regime that even after 30 years has not been able to force its ideal social 
order upon the Iranian society in its entirety. The Islamic Republic’s constant endeavor to 
                                                 
226 ناﺮﺑا ﺰﻴﺧﺎﺘﺳر بﺰﺣ 
227 The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) ﻖﻠﺧ ﻦﻳﺪهﺎﺠﻣ نﺎﻣزﺎﺳ and the Organization of Peoples’ Fadaian 
Guerrillas of Iran (OPFGI) ﻖﻠﺧ ﯽﻳاﺪﻓ ﯼﺎﻬﮑﻳﺮﭼ نﺎﻣزﺎﺳ, did not have any published texts before and even long after 
the revolution showing which political, economic and cultural program they were suggesting for the country. 
Their only “programmatic” publications from the pre-revolution era contained general, ideological debates about 
the strategy and tactics of “guerilla war” and rather superficial political and historical essays to draw lines 
between themselves and traditional left and/or national-liberal political parties like the Tudeh Party ﻩدﻮﺗ بﺰﺣ and 
the National Frontﯽﻠﻣ ﮥﻬﺒﺟ and their entourage. 
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regulate all areas of social life has made certain necessary social institutions disappear or has 
changed them so drastically that the young majority of the population regards them as 
dysfunctional. Blogs are flexible communications and social tools that can be under the complete 
control of their owners. Therefore, they are preferably used by the younger generation to replace 
certain missing or dysfunctional social institutions in Iranian society. 
It so happens that blogs can replace inexistent or dysfunctional media such as daily newspapers 
and specialized journals. Sometimes they become venues for virtual encounters between young 
men and women, who in real life would not be able to get together out of fear of persecution by 
the state. Occasionally they replace political parties and function as platforms for political 
expression. The functional expansion of Persian blogs is a symptom of a social order incapable 
of fulfilling the desires and needs of its citizens. Blogs will continue to promote the culture of 
individualism among the younger Iranian generation and may have an indirect long-term social 
and political impact on the future of Iranian society. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The beginning of the internet era has created new possibilities for Iranian civil society to 
circumvent the government-imposed total control on the established media and to participate in 
an emerging independent virtual information society. The spectacular growth of Persian blogs 
since the summer of 2001 is an indication of Iranian society’s urgent need for alternative means 
of free expression. The early history of blogging in Iran has been dominated by professional 
journalists, many of whom became victims of repressions introduced during the second term of 
the reformist President Khatami in 2001 and continued more severely when his successor, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, seized power in the summer of 2005. 
The Islamic Republic’s conservative factions initiated and sponsored the creation and expansion 
of the country’s internet infrastructure since 1989. Paradoxically, the same forces have 
constantly tried to restrict free internet access and independent publishing via the internet by 
imposing severe filtering and blocking policies as well as pursuing dissident internet authors and 
publishers for defying the regime’s laws and regulations for public expression. The regime and 
the various factions within the camp of its ideological followers also try to use the internet as a 
theater, where they seek to demonstrate their political and ideological presence. 
This ambivalence in the development and socio-political function of the internet in Iran becomes 
apparent when one closely examines the history of the digitization of the holy city of Qom since 
Ai Khamenei took over as the country’s supreme leader, succeeding Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989. 
The digitalization of key texts of Twelver Shiite Islamic Sharia, the computerized management 
and surveillance of the religious training environment of Qom as well as the creation of virtual 
“homes” for all leading spiritual leaders all show how the most conservative Twelver Shiite 
factions in Iran are exploiting computers and the internet as an instrument for exporting ideology, 
while trying to avoid any outside influence. The emergence of conservative religious internet 
publications and particularly personal blogs offers outsiders new insight into the daily life and 
rituals in the closed society of the religious establishment of Qom and its dependencies. 
Five case studies on the digital newspaper ROOZ, the online radio station Zamaneh, the web 
publishing activities of the exiled journalist Ebrahim Nabavi and the exiled writers Reza 
Ghassemi and Mahshid Amirshahi illustrate how the internet has created new possibilities for the 
 
 - 35 -
Iranian diaspora communities to re-establish communications link between exiled dissident 
intellectuals and their potential readers and recipients within and outside side the country. 
The final part of the paper deals with the phenomenon of Persian blogs as a means of mass 
communication for the young population of Iran at large. Blogs were discovered by young 
Iranians as something to replace many institutions missing or suppressed by the totalitarian rule 
of the Islamic Republic. The assimilation of the blog in Persian socio-culture and its functional 
expansion inside the closed Iranian society have led blogs to become much more than what they 
may be in open societies. One peculiarity of Persian blogs can be observed in the use of a new 
Persian sociolect of weblog (and chat room) communication. The use of this sociolect reflects an 
effort by the younger generation of Iranians to redefine their identities and distance themselves 
from the burden of a traditional (religious) culture that they wish to defy. 
Finally, the functional expansion of blogs has also made them into a replacement for non-
existent platforms for free political expression. Because of their individual nature, blogs have 
promoted a new way of individualism. This “positive ego-centrism” seems to have triggered a 
movement towards emancipating politically active individuals from the restrictive force of the 
collective. In the long run, this movement will contribute to social changes by silently 
revolutionizing the political culture of Iran. 
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